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Executive Summary 
 
The use of self-regulatory or privatized enforcement measures in the online environment can 
give rise to various legal issues that affect the fundamental rights of internet users. First, 
privatized enforcement by internet services, without state involvement, can interfere with the 
effective exercise of fundamental rights by internet users. Such interference may, on occasion, 
be disproportionate, but there are legal complexities involved in determining the precise 
circumstances in which this is the case. This is because, for instance, the private entities can 
themselves claim protection under the fundamental rights framework (e.g. the protection of 
property and the freedom to conduct business). 
 
Second, the role of public authorities in the development of self-regulation in view of certain 
public policy objectives can become problematic, but has to be carefully assessed. The 
fundamental rights framework puts limitations on government regulation that interferes with 
fundamental rights. Essentially, such limitations involve the (negative) obligation for States 
not to interfere with fundamental rights. Interferences have to be prescribed by law, pursue a 
legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. At the same time, however, States 
are also under the (positive) obligation to take active measures in order to ensure the effective 
exercise of fundamental rights. In other words, States must do more than simply refrain from 
interference. These positive obligations are of specific interest in the context of private 
ordering impact on fundamental rights, but tend to be abstract and hard to operationalize in 
specific legal constellations. 
 
This study’s central research question is: What legal limitations follow from the fundamental 
rights framework for self-regulation and privatized enforcement online?  
 
It examines the circumstances in which State responsibility can be engaged as a result of self-
regulation or privatized enforcement online. Part I of the study provides an overview and 
analysis of the relevant elements in the European and international fundamental rights 
framework that place limitations on privatized enforcement. Part II gives an assessment of 
specific instances of self-regulation or other instances of privatized enforcement in light of 
these elements.  
 
Part II considers the extent to which certain blocking and filtering practices currently used for 
privatized enforcement online are compatible with fundamental rights, most notably the right 
to freedom of expression, freedom of information, the right to access information, the right to 
privacy, data protection rights, the right to a fair trial, the right to an effective legal remedy, 
freedom to conduct business and freedom to provide services. Three case studies are used for 
this examination: 
 
1. Non-judicial notice-and-takedown procedures of social networking services;  
2. Voluntary use of content-ID tools by hosting providers to avoid liability for illegal 
content, and  
3. Voluntary scanning of private data by online service providers and the subsequent 
reporting of users to law enforcement agencies. 
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The case studies take due account of the degrees of (market) dominance and state 
involvement involved in the examples of privatized enforcement, as well as the availability of 
remedies. 
 
Drawing on its examination of the European and international human rights framework and 
the practices and problems revealed by the illustrative case studies, the study explains various 
ways in which a State may be found to be in breach of its positive obligations for its failure to 
prevent violations of individuals’ fundamental rights as a result of privatized law enforcement 
by online intermediaries. The study has found that criteria that could prove determinative in 
this respect include the: 
 
 Existence or development by the State of relevant regulatory frameworks; 
 Nature of the interference and its intrusiveness (specific techniques of blocking or 
filtering could prove determinative) and resultant chilling effect; 
 Demonstrable degree of involvement or complicity of the State in the interference; 
 Adherence to procedural safeguards by the actor (e.g. transparency, adequacy of 
information; accessibility of terms, conditions and procedures and foreseeability of 
their consequences, etc.); 
 Availability of independent and impartial (judicial) review and redress; 
 Dominant position of actor/availability of viable communicative alternatives; 
 
This study has also sought to fill a normative gap by teasing out the implications of positive 
state obligations in respect of privatized enforcement measures by online intermediaries. In 
doing so, it has borne the above criteria in mind, as well as the overarching concern to strike a 
fair balance between competing rights, and focused on the following positive obligations to:  
 
 Guarantee (media) pluralism;  
 Create a favourable environment for participation by everyone in public debate;  
 Create a favourable environment for freedom of expression for everyone without fear;  
 Ensure effective procedural safeguards and effective remedies in respect of the right 
to freedom of expression;  
 Ensure effective procedural safeguards and effective remedies in respect of the rights 
to privacy and data protection;  
 Guarantee that fundamental rights, including intellectual property rights, are fairly 
balanced against freedom of expression rights. 
 
The study provides a detailed legal analysis that will serve as a firm basis for the further 
operationalization of these positive State obligations in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of the Internet as a dominant medium of contemporary communication has 
been accompanied by extensive reflection on how this – still relatively new – medium could 
best be regulated. In the online environment, public and private communications are largely 
intermediated by private actors, with the result that regulatory control is – in practice – no 
longer the preserve of the State. Traditional regulatory measures are supplemented by 
privatized law enforcement measures, prompting questions – if not fears – concerning the 
effectiveness, transparency and reviewability of such privatized measures. The compliance of 
such measures with recognized human rights standards is also a source of concern. It is 
unclear to what extent and how international human rights standards – with their traditional 
focus on State obligations – should be repurposed in order for them to govern the activities of 
the actors behind privatized enforcement measures.  
 
Against the backdrop of technological change, the perceived shortcomings of traditional, 
State-dominated regulatory techniques are well-documented: formal, slow, rigid, lacking 
insights or participation by key stake-holders, etc. Such shortcomings explain the appeal of 
an alternative regulatory technique – self-regulation – that has increasingly been espoused in 
respect of online activities and communication. Self-regulation is typically by a sector, for a 
sector. When it functions well, it usually boasts flexibility, speed and a strong participatory 
dynamic that can ensure the centrality of sectoral specificities in the self-regulatory 
enterprise. When it does not function well, however, it is often found wanting in terms of 
transparency, implementation machinery and procedural safeguards.  
 
The term, self-regulation, carries different nuances and associations (see further, Section 
1.2.1, below), but it essentially entails sectoral attempts to self-organise for self-regulatory 
purposes, in a way that complements, or obviates the need for, formal legislation. This 
understanding of the term emphasizes the sectoral dimension and a commonality of purpose 
shared by (a number of) actors in a given sector.  
 
As such, self-regulation can be distinguished from particularized or privatized measures of 
law enforcement undertaken by individual actors. Self-regulation could be seen as a sort of 
collaborative privatized enforcement. Where self-regulatory systems are in place, privatized 
enforcement would be expected to comply with the standards governing those systems, 
insofar as the actors in question are subject to the system. 
 
With its primary focus on the online environment, this study embraces instances of both self-
regulatory and other privatized enforcement measures alternately and as relevant, with a view 
to examining their compatibility with States’ obligations under international and European 
human rights law.  
 
Self-regulation continues to be a prevalent form of regulation in the online environment. Self-
regulation and private ordering more generally can constitute effective ways of fulfilling 
public policy objectives such as the protection of minors and the minimization of harms.1 
However, it is also clear that the use of this regulatory strategy by governments and internet 
service providers often entails the enforcement of rules that interfere with fundamental rights 
                                                          
1 See: M. Price & S. Verhulst, Self-Regulation and the Internet, (Kluwer Law International 2004); OECD, The 
Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives (Paris, 2011). 
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of internet users (e.g. blocking of content, access, sharing of personal data), thus limiting the 
effective exercise of fundamental rights by internet users. As has been noted in academic 
literature and in policy documents, this can lead to privatized censorship of online material 
and other interferences with fundamental rights without a clear legal way of redress or 
appropriate safeguards such as due process.2 For instance, an agreement between broadband 
providers and the music industry to cut off internet access of allegedly infringing users will 
severely limit the free exercise of the right to freedom of expression of those affected. And if 
such an agreement would also involve more extensive practices with regard to the handing 
over of, or the creation of a database of, the personal data of the alleged infringers, it would 
also interfere with their rights to privacy and data protection. 
 
Indeed, the use of self-regulatory or privatized enforcement measures in the online 
environment can give rise to various legal issues that affect the fundamental rights of internet 
users. First, privatized enforcement by internet service providers, without state involvement, 
can interfere with the effective exercise of fundamental rights by internet users. Such 
interference may, on occasion, be disproportionate, but there are legal complexities involved 
in determining the precise circumstances in which that is the case. This is because, for 
instance, the private entities can themselves claim protection under the fundamental rights 
framework (specifically, the protection of property and the freedom to conduct a business). 
 
Second and related, the role of public authorities in the development of self-regulation in 
view of certain public policy objectives requires carefully assessment.3  The fundamental 
rights framework puts limitations on government regulation that interferes with fundamental 
rights. Such limitations involve, in the first place, the (negative) obligation for States not to 
interfere with fundamental rights. Interferences have to be prescribed by law, pursue a 
legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. At the same time, however, States 
are also under the (positive) obligation to take active measures (i.e., not just refrain from 
interference) in order to ensure the effective exercise of fundamental rights. Relevant positive 
obligations tend to be abstract and difficult to operationalize in practice, yet they can be 
particularly interesting in the context of the impact of private ordering on fundamental rights. 
 
The issues discussed above have been recognized in constitutional law, international law, 
internet regulation, case law and in legal scholarship,4 but there is a clear need for a more 
focused study of the actual limitations on privatized enforcement following from the 
                                                          
2 See: J. McNamee, ‘The Slide from “Self-Regulation” to Corporate Censorship’, Brussels, European Digital 
Rights (EDRI), 2011; I. Brown, ‘Internet Self-Regulation and Fundamental Rights’ (2010), Index on 
Censorship, Vol. 1; D. Bambauer, ‘Orwell's Armchair’, (2012) 79 University of Chicago Law Review 863; 
OECD, The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives, op. cit.; D. Tambini et al., 
Codifying Cyberspace: Communications Self-Regulation in the Age of Internet Convergence (London, 
Routledge, 2008); S.F. Kreimer, ‘Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the 
Problem of the Weakest Link’, (2006) 11 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155; P.B. Hugenholtz, 
‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’, in I.A. Stamatoudi, Ed., Copyright Enforcement 
and the Internet (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2010), pp. 303-320; B.J. Koops et al., 
‘Should Self-Regulation be the Starting Point?’, in B.J. Koops, M. Lips, C. Prins & M. Schellekens, Eds., 
Starting Points for ICT Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-liners (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2006), pp. 109–149. 
3 See, Hans-Bredow-Institut, & Institue of European Media Law, Final Report Study on Co-Regulation 
Measures in the Media Sector, Hamburg/Saarbruken, 2006. 
4 See: D. Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace: Communications Self-Regulation in the Age of Internet 
Convergence, op. cit.; C.T. Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and 
Legitimacy in Cyberspace (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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fundamental rights framework. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has 
identified this need very forthrightly as follows: 
 
Member states should stop relying on private companies that control the Internet 
and the wider digital environment to impose restrictions that are in violation of 
the state’s human rights obligations. To that end, more guidance is needed on the 
circumstances in which actions or omissions of private companies that infringe 
human rights entail the responsibility of the state. This includes guidance on the 
level of state involvement in the infringement that is necessary for such 
responsibility to be engaged and on the obligations of the state to ensure that the 
general terms and conditions of private companies are not at variance with human 
rights standards. State responsibilities with regard to measures implemented by 
private parties for business reasons, without direct involvement of the state, also 
need to be examined.5  
 
The present study sets out to fill this gap in scholarship and policy-making. It seeks to 
provide legal guidance for those involved in internet policy discussions on recurrent 
questions such as the legitimacy and limitations of online self-regulation and privatized 
enforcement.6 For instance, the European Commission continues to be involved in a number 
of such initiatives at the EU level, e.g. the CEO Coalition to make the Internet a better place 
for kids,7 and there are various instances of privatized enforcement at the national level that 
raise pressing questions from a fundamental rights perspective.8 This study will help those 
involved to provide constructive input to improve such online regulation and prevent undue 
interference with the communicative freedoms of internet users. 
 
1.1. Research questions, scope and methodology  
 
The general research question addressed in this study reads as follows:  
 
What legal limitations follow from the fundamental rights framework for self-regulation and 
privatized enforcement online?  
 
Or, in other words, in which circumstances can State responsibility be engaged as a result of 
self-regulation or privatized enforcement online? To answer these contiguous questions, the 
study will be divided into two parts, namely an overview and analysis of the relevant 
elements in the fundamental rights framework that place limitations on privatized 
enforcement (Part I) and an assessment of specific instances of self-regulation or other 
instances of privatized enforcement in light of these elements (Part II). The study will result 
in a set of conclusions that will contribute to relevant policy-making. 
 
                                                          
5 Recommendation 14, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommendations accompanying 
D. Korff, The rule of law on the Internet and in the wider digital world, Issue paper published by the 
Commissioner for Human Rights (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2014), p. 23. 
6 See: OECD, The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives, op. cit.; J. McNamee, 
‘The Slide from “Self-Regulation” to Corporate Censorship’, op. cit. 
7 For an overview, see: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/self-regulation-better-internet-kids.  
8 See the analysis in N-square, Study on the Scope of Voluntary Law Enforcement Measures Undertaken by 
Internet Intermediaries (2012). 
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Part I will analyze the elements of the fundamental rights framework that are relevant for the 
study, through an examination of fundamental rights instruments, case law and literature. It 
will first set out the protection of the communicative freedoms of internet users in view of 
privatized enforcement measures by internet services. Of particular relevance in this regard 
are the right to freedom of expression and information, the right to confidentiality of 
communications and a number of related rights, namely the right to privacy, the right to due 
process, the right to an effective remedy, the right to (intellectual) property and the freedom 
to conduct a business. The primary focus will be placed on the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Articles 6, 8, 10, 11, 13 and Article 1, Protocol 1) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Articles 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 47). Reference will 
also be made to relevant developments in the international human rights framework and 
fundamental rights protection at the national level.  
 
On this basis, Part I will address the way in which, and under which circumstances, these 
rights place restrictions on private ordering and the use of self-regulation by public 
authorities as a regulatory paradigm for the online environment. It will first discuss the 
possibility, scope and implications of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights, i.e., 
between private parties. Second, it will discuss their implications for the role of the State, 
and public authorities more generally, to safeguard the free exercise of fundamental rights, 
including States’ positive obligations to this end. Pertinent questions in this discussion 
include: which types of private ordering are permissible, preferable to direct regulation or 
even expected from the perspective of the fundamental rights framework, as well as the 
protection of private ordering under the fundamental rights framework itself? The discussion 
also includes considerations of when such actions are to be deemed to infringe fundamental 
rights, on what basis, and what the legal consequence of this might be in practice 
(actionability). Finally, a number of guiding criteria are identified that can be used to assess 
specific instances of privatized enforcement in practice. 
  
Part II will use the guiding criteria identified in Part I to analyze a number of known 
instances of privatized enforcement in the online environment. The focuses of the case-
studies are: (1) Non-judicial notice-and-takedown procedures of social networking services; 
(2) Voluntary use of content-ID tools by hosting providers to avoid liability for illegal 
content, and (3) Voluntary scanning of private data by online service providers and the 
subsequent reporting of users to law enforcement agencies. Each of these focuses 
corresponds to typical situations in which different online actors engage in practices of 
privatized enforcement in ways that implicate various fundamental rights of users. Against 
the background of a rigorous analysis of the relevant legal frameworks, the assessment of the 
legality and proportionality of the privatized enforcement measures used in these selected 
case studies aims to elucidate the legal issues and problems involved for the benefit of 
ongoing policy discussions on relevant matters. 
 
The analysis will also be used to illustrate the way to go about such an assessment in future 
cases, on the basis of the criteria developed in Part I of the study. In other words, it will 
further develop the list of guiding criteria for the assessment of self-regulation and privatized 
enforcement in the online environment. 
 
1.2. Conceptual, definitional and terminological considerations 
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1.2.1. Self-regulation and privatized enforcement 
 
In the context of this study, self-regulation is taken to mean ‘pure’ self-regulation, i.e., the 
“control of activities by the private parties concerned without the direct involvement of 
public authorities”,9 or more forcefully, “a process of self-regulation where the State has no 
role to play”. 10  Other forms of self-regulation exist, which do include government 
involvement, such as ‘enforced self-regulation’, ‘regulated self-regulation’ and ‘self-
monitoring’. Due to the involvement of government, such systems are more characteristic of 
co-regulation and are therefore outside the scope of this study.11 
 
The European Commission has advocated the use of self-regulatory mechanisms as the most 
appropriate form of regulating the internet and mobile technologies, due to constant 
technological developments in those areas. The flexibility of self-regulation is seen as the 
most suitable means of regulating those particular areas.12  For instance, the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive (Article 4(7)) encourages EU Member States to explore the 
suitability of self- and/or co-regulatory techniques. 13  Similarly, both the Directive on 
electronic commerce (Article 16)14 and the Data Protection Directive (Article 27)15  have 
stressed the importance of codes of conduct; approaches which represent a tentative move 
away from traditional regulatory techniques in the direction of self-regulation. 
 
The ‘legitimacy’ or ‘democratic deficit’16 argument, however, indicates that self-regulatory 
mechanisms, which are created and implemented by private actors are less accountable than 
state bodies which are made up of democratically elected representatives.17 Monroe Price and 
Stefaan Verhulst have argued that due to this fact, self-regulatory bodies can never 
completely replace statutory bodies in the media sector since it is the responsibility of the 
state to protect fundamental rights.18 
 
                                                          
9 Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation Final Report, 13 November 2001, p. 83. 
10 Hans-Bredow Institut, Regulated Self-Regulation as a Form of Modern Government: Study 
commissioned by the German Federal Commissioner for Cultural and Media Affairs (Interim 
Report, October 2001) at 3. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/activities/sip/self_regulation/index_en.htm.  
13 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination 
of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the 
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (codified version), [2010] OJ L 
95/1. 
14 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on 
electronic commerce), OJ L 178, 17 July 2000, p. 1. 
15 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to  the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23 
November 1995, p. 31. 
16 E. Lievens, P. Valcke & P.J. Valgaeran, ‘State of the art on regulatory trends in media - Identifying whether, 
what how and who to regulate in social media’, Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT (ICRI) December 2011, 
EMSOC, available at http://emsoc.be/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/State-of-the-art-on-regulatory-trends-in-
media.Identifying-whether-what-how-and-who-to-regulate-in-social-media.pdf.  
17 C.T. Marsden, “Co and Self-Regulation in European Media and Internet Sectors: 
The Results of Oxford University Study”, in C. Möller & A. Amouroux, Eds., The Media Freedom Internet 
Cookbook (Vienna, OSCE, 2004), at 93. 
18 See M. Price & S. Verhulst, “In Search of the Self: Charting the course of selfregulation on the Internet and 
global environment”, in C. Marsden, Regulating the global information society (London, Routledge, 2000), at p. 
65. 
  
6 
 
In a 2011 study of Internet self-regulation, Joe McNamee argues that many of the so-called 
self-regulatory methods currently used by online intermediaries should more appropriately be 
referred to as “devolved law enforcement” where private bodies become “the police, judge, 
jury and executioner with regard to alleged infringements of either the law or of their own 
terms and conditions which may be stricter than law”.19  Some research has shown that 
intermediaries adopt these strict practices due to governmental pressure and unclear legal 
protections.20 According to McNamee, examples of “devolved enforcement” methods include 
non-judicial internet filtering and blocking mechanisms.  
 
Privatized enforcement, a term that is recurrent in this study, refers to instances where private 
parties (voluntarily) undertake law-enforcement measures. This could be seen as a kind of 
private ordering (the regulation of users’ behaviour through contractual or technical 
measures 21 ), based on their own assessment or interpretation of the meaning and 
requirements of relevant law.  
 
1.2.2. Measures against illegal content 
 
There are four main types of measures that can be taken against unwanted content of any kind, 
including therefore illegal content: merely cutting off access to selected material (this is 
usually termed blocking); removing the material altogether from the service (removal); 
monitoring the content in order to identify unwanted material (monitoring) and taking action 
against material identified through monitoring in order to then block access to it or remove it 
(filtering).22   
 
Although all four enforcement measures are closely related to each other, the distinction is 
useful from a legal perspective, as it is capable of remaining close to the technical definitions, 
while also being broad enough to rise above them and focus on the effects that the measures 
pursue, rather than the means used to achieve them.23  
 
The distinction is particularly helpful in the fundamental rights context, as the different types 
of measures engage different fundamental rights.24 Blocking and removal measures mainly 
                                                          
19 J. McNamee, ‘The Slide from “Self-Regulation” to Corporate Censorship’, op. cit, at p. 4. 
20 See further, N-square, Study on the Scope of Voluntary Law Enforcement Measures Undertaken by Internet 
Intermediaries, op. cit. 
21 For a detailed exploration of relevant issues, see N. Elkin-Koren, ‘Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights without 
Laws’, 73 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1155 (1998), available at: 
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol73/iss4/10.  
22 See Steering Committee report on filtering, which recognises that content-control technical actions (which it 
terms “technical filtering measures”) may work by either blocking unwanted content or by filtering it away, 
Council of Europe, “Report by the Group of Specialists on human rights in the information society (MC-S-IS) 
on the use and impact of technical filtering measures for various types of content in the online environment”, 
CM(2008)37 add, available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM%282008%2937&Ver=add.  
23 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 14 April 2011, para. 46. 
24  See also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, “The rule of law on the Internet and in the 
wider digital world”, issue paper, December 2014. Taking a more granular approach that individually assesses 
different types of blocking and filtering, the paper observes at p. 71 that: “IP address blocking is cheap, non-
intrusive and extremely likely to block unrelated content; domain blocking is cheap, non-intrusive and 
somewhat less likely to block unrelated content; Cleanfeed (a hybrid system developed by British Telecom) is 
somewhat more intrusive but very narrowly targeted; deep packet inspection is vastly intrusive and a major 
restriction on privacy rights, but also the most accurate.” 
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risk endangering users’ freedom of expression and information, as well as, potentially, the 
freedom of the intermediary to conduct a business. Monitoring, which necessarily involves 
the examination of the private communications of innocent bystanders, although certainly 
capable on creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression, primarily brings users’ privacy 
and data protection into play. Filtering, as the combination of the two, has the potential to 
endanger both rights. Accordingly, this distinction shall be followed in the sections below. 
 
In the following paragraphs, the concepts of blocking/removal, monitoring and filtering of 
content will be briefly defined. 
 
1.2.3. Blocking and removal 
 
Blocking and removal require the identification of the material to be blocked through means 
other than monitoring. This can be achieved, for example, through notification of the 
unlawful material. Notice-and-take-down regimes in fact rely on exactly such “mere 
blocking/removal” systems, the “notice” by the right holder or another party being the means 
by which the illegal content is discovered by the intermediary so that access to it may be 
denied. Under this sort of scheme, therefore, content cannot be blocked or removed unless it 
has already been identified and included in a pre-fixed list of undesirable content by the 
intermediary undertaking the blocking or removal. Blocking/removal lists will vary from 
intermediary to intermediary, meaning that some material may be blocked or removed by 
some intermediaries, but not by others. The blocking or removal may take place at the point 
at which the data is requested or at that at which it is sent and it may involve specifically 
identified communications, user accounts or entire websites.  
 
Blocking techniques may vary. For example, URL-based blocking compares the website 
requested by the user with a pre-determined “blacklist” of URLs of objectionable websites 
selected by the intermediary imposing the blocking. URLs (or uniform resource locators, 
otherwise known more colloquially as “web addresses”) are character strings that constitute a 
reference (an address) to a resource on the internet and that are usually displayed inside an 
address bar located at the top of the user interface of web browsers. The blacklist is compiled 
by collecting the websites that have been deemed block-worthy, usually through notification 
by interested parties or identification by the intermediary itself. If a webpage matches one of 
the sites on this list, the dialogue is redirected before the request leaves the private network, 
usually to a warning page that explains what has happened. As a result, the user is barred 
from entering the site. “Whitelists” of URL addresses that users are allowed to visit reverse 
the principle: instead of only letting users through to URLs that are not on the list, they only 
permit access to URLs that are on the list. Another blocking technique is offered by IP-based 
blocking. This operates in a similar manner to URL blocking, but uses IP (Internet Protocol) 
addresses, i.e., the numerical labels assigned to devices, such as computers, that participate in 
a network that uses the internet protocol for communication. IP-based blocking has a higher 
chance of resulting in unintended “over-blocking” than targeted URL blocking as a result of 
IP sharing, as a given unique IP address may correspond to multiple URLs of different 
websites hosted on the same server.25  
 
Removal of content rests on very similar assumptions as those just identified for the case of 
                                                          
25  Council of Europe, “Report by the Group of Specialists on human rights in the information society (MC-S-
IS) on the use and impact of technical filtering measures for various types of content in the online environment”, 
CM(2008)37 add, available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM%282008%2937&Ver=add.  
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blocking with two major differences. Firstly, while blocking can be “target specific”, meaning 
that it is able to discriminate for which users the content should be available and for which it 
should be blocked (a feature also known as “withholding”), removal is more definitive in 
character and general in scope. Once specific content is removed from a server it will not be 
available to any user. Secondly, removals can logically be executed only by the party who has 
control over the hosting service where the content is stored, namely a hosting provider itself. 
Access providers cannot proceed to real removal of content, although they can implement 
very pervasive blocking to similar effects.  
 
1.2.4. Monitoring 
 
Monitoring refers to the act of proactively seeking out infringing content. Monitoring is 
therefore the main element that distinguishes blocking/removal from filtering. Monitoring 
techniques vary depending on a number of factors: the type of content sought, the type of 
intermediary (access provider or hosting provider), the type of communications (plain text or 
encrypted) and the nature of the communication (client-server, peer-to-peer, etc.). Monitoring 
tools such as content control software can be placed at various levels in the internet structure: 
they can be implemented by all intermediaries operating in a certain geographical area or 
only by one or some of those intermediaries; they can be applied to all of the customers of an 
intermediary or only to some of them (for example only to customers originating form 
country X); they can look only for certain content which is commonly transmitted through 
specific services (such as illegal file sharing through peer-to-peer networks) or 
indiscriminately to all content. 
 
Monitoring by hosting providers usually requires the use of software (such as web crawlers) 
that searches for the presence on their servers of specifically identified illegal content. The 
identification of the illegal content can be performed in different ways: sometimes through 
lists of protected subject matter submitted to the intermediary by right-holders, while in other 
cases specific “strings” or other indicators of content illegality are employed (e.g. the use of 
specific words or expressions that may be indicators of crime-related activities). Monitoring 
can also operate before (or at the same time as) the content is uploaded. 
 
Monitoring by access providers requires the use of software that is able to “intercept” and 
“read” the information transmitted over their network’s segment. This practice can be 
particularly invasive of users’ privacy and communications. The internet, technically 
speaking, is a packet-switched network which means, inter alia, that a single piece of 
information, say an e-mail, in order to go from point A to point B, is subdivided in many 
small packets of information and sent along, usually, the most de-congested route.26 This 
means that different packets of the same communication commonly travel through different 
routes to reach point B. It follows that in order to intercept potentially infringing content it is 
not possible or sufficient to monitor only one segment of the network, since the content, or 
part thereof, could follow a different route. Once all the packets of a single data transfer are 
gathered and aligned following the right sequence, it becomes possible to “read” the content 
of the data transfer by looking into the “packets body”. This is usually done employing 
techniques of “Deep Packet Inspection”, whereby not only the “headers” of the data packet 
are read (this is a necessary part of any data transmission over the Internet), but also the 
“body” of the data packet is read in order to identify the content. 
                                                          
26 See T. Margoni & M. Perry, ‘Deep pockets, packets, and safe harbours’ (2013) (74: 6) Ohio State Law 
Journal 1195. 
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1.2.5. Filtering 
 
Filtering is comparable to blocking in respect of the final result, however it goes one step 
further. It takes a more proactive approach to the identification of objectionable material 
through incorporating monitoring as the unwanted content identification technique. Instead of 
waiting for unlawful content to be reported, intermediaries may decide to, or be required to, 
attempt to locate as many instances of illegal content as possible. Modern technical 
instruments of identification and surveillance greatly assist such efforts. For example, 
fingerprinting technology uses a condensed digital summary of each piece of protected 
content, e.g. of a videoclip (a “fingerprint” of the content), to identify it among all the traffic 
uploaded on a hosting website or flowing through a network, by means of comparison with a 
pre-existing extensive reference database of all fingerprints collected by the intermediary 
applying the filtering. Right-holders who want to protect their works online can contribute a 
fingerprint of that work to the database before an infringement is ever identified. If a match is 
detected, the offending material is removed. One such system is YouTube’s Content ID (see 
further, Case study 2, below). This creates an ID file for copyright-protected audio and video 
material whose owners have signed up for participation and stores it in a database. When a 
video is uploaded onto the platform, it is automatically scanned against the database. If a 
match is found, the video is flagged as a potential copyright violation. The content owner 
then has the choice of muting the video, blocking it from being viewed, tracking the video’s 
viewing statistics or monetising the video by adding advertisements.27 
 
The advantage of filtering technology over simple blocking is that the detection of unwanted 
material is automated, simplifying the enforcement process. Content filtering can also allow 
for certain types of content to be removed from pages that are intentionally allowed by URL 
blocking. A major disadvantage is that it involves the monitoring of the totality of the 
information passing through the intermediary, which may impose a big technical and 
financial burden on it. This burden may be manageable for platforms that simply have to 
examine content uploaded to their own servers, but can pose difficulties for internet access 
providers, which would have to inspect each and every communication passing through their 
networks to achieve the same effect. As AG Cruz Villalón observed, to be effective, filtering 
must be “systematic, universal and progressive”.28 There is an added level of difficulty if the 
intermediary has to break encryption measures in order to identify the content and evaluate its 
blockworthiness. As a result of all these obstacles filtering systems are not infallible. An 
independent test of YouTube’s Content ID in 2009, for example, uploaded multiple versions 
of the same song to YouTube and concluded that, while the system was “surprisingly 
resilient” in finding copyright violations in the audio tracks of videos, it could be easily 
sabotaged and was not intelligent enough to detect useful meta-information, such as repeat 
infringers.29 
 
Filtering can also risk falling foul of legal limitations. This was, for example, found to be the 
case with the filtering technology that Belgian collective management society SABAM 
                                                          
27  YouTube, “How Content ID Works”, available at: 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en.  
28  Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 14 April 2011, para. 48. 
29  Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Testing YouTube's Audio Content ID System”, 29 April 2009, available at: 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/testing-youtubes-aud.  
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(Société d’Auteurs Belge – Belgische Auteurs Maatschappij) attempted to impose on internet 
access provider Scarlet. As the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles noted, the system advocated by 
SABAM would require the processing of all electronic communications passing via the 
intermediary’s services, both incoming and outgoing, in particular those involving the use of 
peer-to-peer software, of all of the ISP’s customers, in abstracto and as a preventive measure, 
exclusively at the cost of the ISP and for an unlimited period, in order to identify on its 
network the movement of electronic files containing a copyrighted work and the subsequent 
blocking of the transfer of such files. The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter, 
CJEU) found such a system incompatible with a fair balance with competing fundamental 
rights, including the freedom of business of the intermediary, the freedom of information of 
its users and their rights to privacy and data protection.30  
 
It is important to note that filtering need not necessarily be done by machine: if an 
intermediary engages humans to manually monitor all communications passing through its 
systems for unwanted material, that operation would equally qualify as filtering.31  
                                                          
30  Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 
24 November 2011. 
31  “Principles for User Generated Content Services”, available at: www.ugcprinciples.com. 
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PART I 
2. Overview and analysis of relevant fundamental rights 
instruments 
2.1. The Council of Europe  
 
The Council of Europe has adopted a number of treaties that are concerned with the 
protection of the rights to freedom of expression and information, as well as their corollary 
media freedom, both off- and online. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is 
the oldest and most important of those treaties. Other treaties with relevant thematic focusess 
have been elaborated by the Council of Europe; they are all inspired by the ECHR and are 
complementary to it. Examples of those treaties include: the Convention on Cybercrime and 
its Amending Protocol, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic 
nature committed through computer systems; the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and its Additional Protocol regarding 
supervisory authorities and transborder data flows; the European Convention on Transfrontier 
Television (as amended); the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, etc. 
The following section will provide a panorama of the most relevant ECHR provisions that 
safeguard communication rights. Relevant provisions of other Council of Europe treaties and 
other normative standards will be introduced into the analysis later in the study, as 
appropriate.  
The term “communication rights” is not enshrined in leading international human rights 
treaties. It is a term of convenience that covers a cluster of rights that are indispensable for 
the effective exercise of communicative freedoms. These rights typically include the right to 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, privacy, etc. They also include 
the right to an effective remedy whenever the aforementioned rights have been violated, as 
well as various process rights that serve to guarantee procedural fairness and justice. These 
communication rights can also be described, more broadly, as participatory rights as their 
exercise is a prerequisite for effective participation in democratic society. Whatever the 
preferred collective term, it is clear that the interplay between these rights is increasing as 
society steadily becomes more and more digitized.32   
 
2.1.1. The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Before we proceed to a detailed analysis of the ECHR provisions that protect communication 
rights, we must first examine the interpretative principles that allow the European Court of 
                                                          
32 See further: D. Mac Síthigh, ‘From freedom of speech to the right to communicate’ in Price, M.E., Verhulst, 
S.G. & Morgan, L. (eds.) (2013) Routledge Handbook of Media Law, London & New York: Routledge, 2013, 
pp. 175-191, at 186-187. 
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Human Rights (hereafter, ECtHR) – which is not known for its “abstract theorising”33 – to 
shape the future contours of communication rights: the margin of appreciation doctrine; the 
practical and effective doctrine; the living instrument doctrine and the positive obligations 
doctrine. Each will now be dealt with briefly in turn and the positive obligations doctrine, 
because of its centrality in this study, will be examined in greater detail in Section 3, below. 
Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, which has an important influence on how the 
ECHR is interpreted at national level, States are given a certain amount of discretion in how 
they regulate expression.34 That discretion is, however, supervised by the ECtHR and when 
exercising its supervisory function, the Court does not take the place of the national 
authorities, but reviews decisions taken by them (see further, below). 
According to the practical and effective doctrine, all rights guaranteed by the ECHR must be 
“practical and effective” and not merely “theoretical or illusory”.35 In other words, the rights 
must be real and meaningful – they cannot be mere paper tigers. This means that it is 
essential that rights be interpreted in a way that is informed by contextual specificities. 
Whether the exercise of a right is effective or whether an interference with a right is justified, 
will depend on the broader circumstances of the case. 
Under the “living instrument” doctrine,36  the ECHR “must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions”.37 The aim of this “dynamic and evolutive”38 interpretive approach is 
to guard against the risk that the Convention would ever become static. The doctrine applies 
to both the substance and the enforcement processes 39  of the Convention and even to 
institutional bodies which did not exist and were not envisaged at the time of its drafting.40  
The essence of the positive obligations doctrine is that in order for States to ensure that 
everyone can exercise all of the rights enshrined in the ECHR in a practical and effective 
manner, it is often not sufficient for State authorities merely to honour their negative 
obligation not to interfere with those rights. Positive – or affirmative – action may be required 
on the part of States in some circumstances, with possible implications for relations between 
private parties or individuals.  
 
2.1.2. Freedom of expression 
 
                                                          
33 A. Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 5: 1 
(2005), 57-79, at 61. 
34 Initially developed in the Court’s case-law, a reference to the doctrine will be enshrined in the Preamble to the 
ECHR as soon as the Convention’s Amending Protocol No. 15 enters into force. 
35 Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, para. 24. 
36 For an overview of the historical development of the “living instrument” doctrine (including recent 
developments) by the European Court of Human Rights, see: A. Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European 
Court of Human Rights”, op. cit. 
37 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, para. 31; Matthews v. the United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I, para. 39. 
38 Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, ECHR 2002-IV, para. 68; Christine Goodwin v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI, para. 74. Mowbray has pointed out that the Court has 
recently been making references to the “living instrument” doctrine and the “dynamic and evolutive” 
interpretative approach pretty much interchangeably: op. cit., p. 64. 
39 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, para. 71. 
40 Matthews v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., para. 39. 
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Article 10 ECHR is the centrepiece of European-level protection for the right to freedom of 
expression. It reads: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Article 10(1) sets out the right to freedom of expression as a compound right comprising the 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. As such, there are 
three distinct components to the right, corresponding to different aspects of the 
communicative process, i.e., holding views, receiving and sending content. These rights are 
prerequisites for the functioning of media and journalism, including in an online environment. 
Article 10(1), ECHR, countenances the possibility for States to regulate the audiovisual 
media by means of licensing schemes. This provision was inserted as a reaction to the abuse 
of radio, television and cinema for Nazi propaganda during the Second World War. Article 
10(2) then proceeds to trammel the core right set out in the preceding paragraph. It does so by 
enumerating a number of grounds, based on which the right may legitimately be restricted, 
provided that the restrictions are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society. 
It justifies this approach by linking the permissibility of restrictions on the right to the 
existence of duties and responsibilities which govern its exercise. Whereas the right to 
freedom of expression is regarded as being subject to general duties and responsibilities, the 
European Court of Human Rights sometimes refers to the specific duties or responsibilities 
pertaining to specific professions, e.g., journalism, education, military service, etc. The Court 
has held that those duties or responsibilities may vary, depending on the technology being 
used. In light of the casuistic nature of the Court’s jurisprudence on duties and 
responsibilities and in light of its ongoing efforts to apply its free expression principles to the 
Internet (see further, below), it is only a matter of time before it begins to proffer indications 
of the nature of Internet actors’ duties and responsibilities in respect of freedom of expression. 
Notwithstanding the potential offered by Article 10(2) to restrict the right to freedom of 
expression on certain grounds (although legitimate restrictions must be narrowly drawn and 
interpreted restrictively), as the European Court of Human Rights famously stated in its 
Handyside judgment, information and ideas which “offend, shock or disturb the State or any 
sector of the population” must be allowed to circulate in order to safeguard the “pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’”. 41  The 
question of how far the Handyside principle actually reaches in practice is very pertinent as 
regards online content due to the widely-perceived permissiveness of the Internet as a 
medium. It is of particular relevance for Case study 1, below. 
                                                          
41 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, para. 49. 
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Aside from the permissible grounds for restrictions set out in Article 10(2), ECHR, the right 
to freedom of expression may also be limited, or rather denied, on the basis of Article 17, 
ECHR (‘Prohibition of abuse of rights’).42 Whenever it has been applied by the Court, this 
article has been used consistently to ensure that Article 10 protection is not extended to racist, 
xenophobic or anti-Semitic speech; statements denying, disputing, minimising or condoning 
the Holocaust, or (neo-)Nazi ideas. This means that in practice, sanctions for racist speech do 
not violate the right to freedom of expression of those uttering the racist speech. In other 
words, national criminal and/or civil law can legitimately punish racist speech. However, the 
criteria used by the Court for resorting to Article 17 (as opposed to Article 10(2)) are unclear, 
leading to divergent jurisprudence.43 
The scope of the right to freedom of expression is not only determined by the permissible 
restrictions set out in Articles 10(2) and 17, ECHR. It is also determined by the interplay 
between the right and other Convention rights, including the right to privacy, freedom of 
assembly and association and freedom of religion. 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a standard test to determine whether 
Article 10, ECHR, has been violated. Put simply, whenever it has been established that there 
has been an interference with the right to freedom of expression, that interference must first 
of all be prescribed by law. In other words, it must be adequately accessible and reasonably 
foreseeable in its consequences. Second, it must pursue a legitimate aim (i.e., correspond to 
one of the aims set out in Article 10(2)). Third, it must be necessary in a democratic society, 
i.e., it must correspond to a “pressing social need”, and it must be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim(s) pursued.  
The margin of appreciation doctrine, sketched above, is relevant for the assessment of the 
necessity in democratic society of a measure interfering with the right to freedom of 
expression. The extent of the discretion afforded to States under the doctrine varies 
depending on the nature of the expression in question. Whereas States only have a narrow 
margin of appreciation in respect of political expression, they enjoy a wider margin of 
appreciation in respect of public morals, decency and religion. This is usually explained by 
the absence of a European consensus on whether/how such matters should be regulated. 
When exercising its supervisory function, the European Court of Human Rights reviews the 
decisions taken by the national authorities pursuant to their margin of appreciation under 
Article 10, ECHR. Thus, the Court looks at the expression complained of in the broader 
circumstances of the case and determines whether the reasons given by the national 
authorities for the restriction and how they implemented it are “relevant and sufficient” in the 
context of the interpretation of the Convention. 
 
2.1.3. Other communication rights  
 
                                                          
42 It reads: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right 
to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth 
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention”. 
43 H. Cannie & D. Voorhoof, “The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights 
Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?”, 29 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights (No. 1, 2011), pp. 54-83; D. Keane, “Attacking hate speech under Article 17 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, 25 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (No. 4, 2007), pp. 641-663. 
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Besides the right to freedom of expression, the other main substantive communication rights 
featuring in this study are the right to privacy and the right to freedom of assembly and 
association.  
 
The right to privacy is safeguarded in Article 8, ECHR, which is entitled, ‘Right to respect 
for private and family life’. It reads: 
 
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The growing case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 8 shows attention 
for relational and informational dimensions to privacy, as well as awareness of contextual 
specificities and implications of digitised and online environment. The scope of Article 8 also 
includes the protection of personal data. Relevant case-law also transcends the limitations of 
the phrase “interference by a public authority” and covers relations between individuals and 
third-party actors (see further, below).  
 
The right to freedom of assembly and association is safeguarded by Article 11, ECHR: 
 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
 
2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the 
administration of the State. 
 
Unlike Articles 8 and 10, this provision does not include an explicit reference to “interference 
by public authority” and the Court’s relevant case-law repeatedly and explicitly 
acknowledges that third parties (and not only State authorities) can interfere with the right to 
freedom of assembly, e.g., in the context of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations.44 
Rights of access to public spaces and quasi-public spaces (e.g., a privately-owned shopping 
mall) for communicative purposes have also been considered in the Court’s case-law and 
these cases concerning physical access raise interesting questions for virtual/online access.45  
 
The right to protection of property is not enshrined in the text of the Convention, but in 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) to the Convention: 
 
                                                          
44 Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139. 
45 Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, ECHR 2003-VI. 
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Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State 
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties. 
 
Although the right is set out in A1P1, it is nevertheless to be seen as an integral part of the 
Convention. Relevant case law of the ECtHR clarifies that the notion of property includes 
intellectual property46 and the relationship of the right to intellectual property to the right to 
freedom of expression has been considered in a number of recent cases.47 
 
Alongside these substantive communication rights, various process rights are also important, 
such as the right to a fair trial and, even more pertinently, the right to an effective remedy. 
Those rights are guaranteed in Articles 6 and 13, respectively. 
 
Article 6 concerns the determination of an individual’s “civil rights and obligations” and “any 
criminal charge” against him/her. In these contexts, “everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law” 
(Article 6(1)). The presumption of innocence applies to charges for criminal offences (Article 
6(2)). As will be argued below, the process values prioritized in the case-law pertaining to 
Article 6, also apply mutatis mutandis to administrative redress mechanisms that operate 
outside the formal institutional structures of the State, e.g., self-regulatory bodies.  
 
Article 13, for its part, reads: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
The undertaking by the ECHR to ensure that individuals have effective remedies for breaches 
of their human rights is one of the most important features of the Convention and its 
adjudicative mechanism. It is a stand-alone guarantee that usefully complements the Court’s 
pledge to ensure that ECHR-rights are effective in practice. 
2.1.4. Consolidating communication rights in an online environment 
The particular importance of the media for democratic society has been stressed repeatedly 
by the Court. The media can make important contributions to public debate by (widely) 
disseminating information and ideas and thereby contributing to opinion-forming processes 
within society. As the Court consistently acknowledges, this is particularly true of the 
audiovisual media because of their reach and impact. The Court has traditionally regarded the 
audiovisual media as more pervasive than the print media. It has yet to set out a clear policy 
line for online media, but it has ventured to say, in 2013, that “the choices inherent in the use 
of the internet and social media mean that the information emerging therefrom does not have 
                                                          
46 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, para. 72, ECHR 2007-I. 
47  Ashby Donald and Others v. France, no. 36769/08, 10 January 2013; Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde 
Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.), no. 40397/12, ECHR 2013.  
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the same synchronicity or impact as broadcasted information”.48 It continued by stating that 
notwithstanding “the significant development of the internet and social media in recent years, 
there is no evidence of a sufficiently serious shift in the respective influences of the new and 
of the broadcast media in the [United Kingdom] to undermine the need for special measures 
for the latter”.49 The media can also make important contributions to public debate by serving 
as fora for discussion and debate. This is especially true of new media technologies which 
have considerable potential for high levels of individual and group participation.50  
Furthermore, the role of “public watchdog” is very often ascribed to the media in a 
democratic society. In other words, the media should monitor the activities of governmental 
authorities vigilantly and publicise any wrong-doing on their part. In respect of information 
about governmental activities, but also more broadly in respect of matters of public interest 
generally, the Court has held time and again that: “[n]ot only do the media have the task of 
imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them”.51 
 
To date, the European Court of Human Rights has engaged meaningfully with the Internet 
generally,52 and the specific features of the online communications environment in particular, 
in a surprisingly limited number of cases.53 It has focused on the duty of care of Internet 
service providers,54 the added value of online newspaper archives for news purposes55 and 
interestingly, the challenges of sifting through the informational abundance offered by the 
Internet.56 How the Court dealt with the final point is of interest: 
 
“It is true that the Internet is an information and communication tool particularly 
distinct from the printed media, in particular as regards the capacity to store and 
transmit information. The electronic network serving billions of users worldwide 
is not and potentially cannot be subject to the same regulations and control. The 
risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for 
private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press. Therefore, the 
policies governing reproduction of material from the printed media and the 
Internet may differ. The latter undeniably have to be adjusted according to the 
technology’s specific features in order to secure the protection and promotion of 
the rights and freedoms concerned. [...].”57 
 
                                                          
48 Animal Rights Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, para. 119. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See further in this connection: Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, ECHR 2012. 
51 The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. 65. 
52 T. Murphy and G. Ó Cuinn, “Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of Human 
Rights”, 10(4) Human Rights Law Review (2010), pp. 601-638, at p. 636; European Court of Human Rights 
(Research Division), Internet: case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, Council of 
Europe, 2011); European Court of Human Rights (Press Unit), Fact sheet – New technologies (Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe, February 2015). 
53 T. McGonagle, ‘User-generated Content and Audiovisual News: The Ups and Downs of an Uncertain 
Relationship’, in S. Nikoltchev, Ed., Open Journalism, IRIS plus 2013-2 (Strasbourg, European Audiovisual 
Observatory), pp. 7-25. 
54 K.U. v. Finland, no. 2872/02, ECHR 2008, para. 49. 
55 Times Newspapers Ltd. (nos. 1 & 2) v. the United Kingdom, nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, ECHR 2009, para. 
45; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, no. 33846/07, 16 July 2013. 
56 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, no. 33014/05, ECHR 2011.  
57 Ibid., para. 63. 
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The Court made these observations in a case involving a newspaper that, owing to a lack of 
funds, “often reprinted articles and other material obtained from various public sources, 
including the Internet”.58 In short, the Court is calling for a rethink of familiar principles of 
media freedom and regulation in the expansive, global context of the Internet. 
 
Again, these findings by the Court focus on journalists and professional media, but in light of 
the expanding understandings of the roles such professions play, they are also of relevance 
for other actors. This reading is confirmed by the reference to the importance of the Internet 
“for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression generally”.59 The Court has repeatedly 
recognised that besides professional journalists and media, individuals, civil society 
organisations, whistle-blowers and academics can all make valuable contributions to public 
debate, thereby playing a role similar or equivalent to that traditionally played by the 
institutionalised media. 
 
From the cited passage, above, it is clear that the Court places the onus on states’ authorities 
to develop a legal framework clarifying issues such as responsibility and liability. It is 
unclear, however, to what extent an equivalent self-regulatory framework would suffice. The 
Court has held in other case law that self- and co-regulatory mechanisms can suffice, 
provided they include effective guarantees of rights and effective remedies for violations of 
rights.60 In any case, it is clear that “the State cannot absolve itself from responsibility by 
delegating its obligations to private bodies or individuals”.61 As will be explained in Section 
3.4, below, State responsibility can, in certain circumstances, be triggered indirectly by the 
acts or omissions of private bodies. 
 
In its Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 2012, the Court recognised in a 
very forthright way the importance of the Internet in the contemporary communications 
landscape. It stated that the Internet “has become one of the principal means for individuals to 
exercise their right to freedom of expression today: it offers essential tools for participation in 
activities and debates relating to questions of politics or public interest”.62 
 
This recognition clearly places great store by the participatory dimension of free expression. 
The Court found that a measure resulting in the wholesale blocking of Google Sites in Turkey 
“by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, substantially restricted the rights 
of Internet users and had a significant collateral effect”.63 The interference “did not satisfy the 
foreseeability requirement under the Convention and did not afford the applicant the degree 
of protection to which he was entitled by the rule of law in a democratic society”.64 In 
addition, it produced arbitrary effects. 65  Furthermore, the Court found that “the judicial-
review procedures concerning the blocking of Internet sites are insufficient to meet the 
                                                          
58 Ibid., para. 5. 
59 Times Newspapers Ltd v. United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), no. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, 10 March 2009. 
60 For details and analysis, see: Hans-Bredow-Institut for Media Research, University of Hamburg, Study on Co-
Regulation Measures in the Media Sector, Final Report, Study for the European Commission, Directorate 
Information Society and Media, 2006, pp. 147-152. See, in particular, the analysis of Peck v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 44647/98, ECHR 2003-I, paras. 108 & 109. 
61 Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, Series A no. 247-C, para. 27; see also, Van der 
Mussele v. Belgium, 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, paras.  29-30. 
62 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 54. 
63 Ibid., para. 66. See also the later judgment of Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, § 64, 
ECHR 2015. 
64 Ibid., para. 67. 
65 Ibid., para. 68. 
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criteria for avoiding abuse, as domestic law does not provide for any safeguards to ensure that 
a blocking order in respect of a specific site is not used as a means of blocking access in 
general”.66 This reasoning suggests that the Court would also disapprove of other intrusive or 
overly-broad blocking techniques, such as those detailed in the Introduction to this study.  
In the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia,67 the Estonian courts held a large online news portal liable 
for the unlawful third-party comments posted on its site in response to one of its own articles, 
despite having an automated filtering system and a notice-and-takedown procedure in place. 
The Grand Chamber of the Court found that this did not amount to a violation of Article 10 
ECHR. The judgment has proved very controversial, particularly among free speech 
advocates, who fear that such liability would create pro-active monitoring obligations for 
Internet intermediaries, leading to private censorship and a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression. 
 
The contentious nature of the judgment stems from a number of the Court’s key lines of 
reasoning therein. First, the Court took the view that “the majority of the impugned 
comments amounted to hate speech or incitements to violence and as such did not enjoy the 
protection of Article 10”.68 By classifying the comments as such extreme forms of speech, the 
Court purports to legitimize the stringent measures that it sets out for online news portals to 
take against such manifestly unlawful content. The dissenting judges object to this approach, 
pointing out that “[t]hroughout the whole judgment the description or characterisation of the 
comments varies and remains non-specific”69 and “murky”.70 
 
Secondly, the Court endorses the view of the Estonian Supreme Court that Delfi could have 
avoided liability if it had removed the impugned comments “without delay”. 71  This 
requirement is problematic because, as pointed out by the dissenting judges, it is not linked to 
notice or actual knowledge72 and paves the way to systematic, pro-active monitoring of third-
party content. 
 
Thirdly, the Court underscored that Delfi was “a professionally managed Internet news portal 
run on a commercial basis which sought to attract a large number of comments on news 
articles published by it”.73 The dissenting judges aptly argued that the economic activity of 
the news portal does not cancel out the potential of comment sections for facilitating 
individual contributions to public debate in a way that “does not depend on centralised media 
decisions”.74   
 
Fourthly, the Court failed to appreciate or articulate the broader ramifications of far-reaching 
Internet intermediary liability for online freedom of expression generally. It was at pains to 
stress that “the case does not concern other fora on the Internet where third-party comments 
can be disseminated, for example an Internet discussion forum or a bulletin board where 
users can freely set out their ideas on any topics without the discussion being channelled by 
any input from the forum’s manager; or a social media platform where the platform provider 
                                                          
66 Ibid. 
67 Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, ECHR 2015. 
68 Ibid., para. 136. 
69 Ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajó and Tsotsoria, para. 12. 
70 Ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 13. 
71 Ibid., para. 153. 
72 Ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 8. 
73 Ibid., para. 144. 
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does not offer any content and where the content provider may be a private person running 
the website or a blog as a hobby”.75 The dissenting judges again took great exception to this 
line of reasoning, describing it as an exercise in “damage control”.76     
 
While the above developments remain quite tentative in the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, they are more advanced in other Council of Europe standard-setting 
activities.77 Although such standard-setting work, notably by the organisation’s Committee of 
Ministers78 and Parliamentary Assembly,79 is not legally-binding, it is politically persuasive 
and offers a number of advantages over treaty-based approaches.80  It can, for example, 
engage with issues in a more detailed way than is possible either in treaty provisions or case-
law or monitoring pursuant to treaty provisions. It can also address issues that have not arisen 
in case-law, but are nevertheless relevant. In the same vein, it can identify and address 
emergent or anticipated developments, thereby ensuring a dynamic/modern approach to 
relevant issues. 
 
Standard-setting by the Committee of Ministers includes a number of focuses that are 
relevant for the present study, e.g.: self-regulation concerning cyber content; human rights 
and the rule of law in the Information Society; freedom of expression and information in the 
new information and communications environment; the public service value of the Internet; 
respect for freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet filters; network 
neutrality; freedom of expression, association and assembly with regard to privately operated 
Internet platforms and online service providers; human rights and search engines; human 
rights and social networking services, and risks to fundamental rights stemming from digital 
tracking and other surveillance technologies. These normative texts generally explore their 
subject matter in an expansive way, while grounding the exploration in relevant principles 
that have already been established by the ECtHR. As such, the texts tease out the likely 
application of key legal principles to new developments, thereby also giving an indication of 
the likely content of specific State obligations in respect of those principles. Their role and 
influence, while not legally-binding, can nevertheless be seen as instructive. 
Thus, the Committee of Ministers has highlighted the gravity of violations of Articles 10 and 
11, ECHR, “which might result from politically motivated pressure exerted on privately 
operated Internet platforms and online service providers”.81 It has insisted that the use of 
filters be strictly in accordance with Articles 10 and 6, ECHR, and specifically be targeted, 
transparent and subject to independent and impartial review procedures. It encourages 
member states and the private sector to “strengthen the information and guidance to users 
who are subject to filters in private networks, including information about the existence of, 
and reasons for, the use of a filter and the criteria upon which the filter operates”.82 It has also 
                                                          
75 Ibid., para. 116. 
76 Ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 9. 
77 See generally: W. Benedek and M.C. Kettemann, Freedom of expression and the Internet (Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2013). 
78 S. Nikoltchev & T. McGonagle, Eds, Freedom of Expression and the Media: Standard-setting by the Council 
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called on member states to “promote transparent self- and co-regulatory mechanisms for 
search engines, in particular with regard to the accessibility of content declared illegal by a 
court or competent authority, as well as of harmful content, bearing in mind the Council of 
Europe’s standards on freedom of expression and due process rights”.83 Finally, in the present 
string of examples, the Committee of Ministers has stated that social networking services 
should refrain from “the general blocking and filtering of offensive or harmful content in a 
way that would hamper its access by users”;84 develop and communicate editorial policies 
about “inappropriate content”, in line with Article 10, ECHR,85 and “ensure that users are 
aware of the threats to their human rights and able to seek redress when their rights have been 
adversely affected”.86 It has called on member states to “encourage the establishment of 
transparent co-operation mechanisms for law-enforcement authorities and social networking 
services”, which “should include respect for the procedural safeguards required under Article 
8, Article 10 and Article 11”, ECHR. 87 
2.2. The European Union 
 
The European Union, too, has adopted an array of texts that govern media, journalistic and 
Internet freedom and communication rights generally. As will be seen below, there is a 
degree of alignment between Council of Europe and European Union approaches to media 
freedom and regulation.  
2.2.1. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Since the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union has acquired the same legal status as the EU treaties, thereby enhancing its 
relevance. The Charter’s provisions “are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law” (Article 51(1)). “They shall therefore 
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance 
with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred 
on it in the Treaties” (ibid.).  
The Charter’s provisions which “contain principles may be implemented by legislative and 
executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of 
Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective 
powers” (Article 52(5)). However, they shall be “judicially cognisable only in the 
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality” (ibid.).  
It is important to ensure that the human rights standards elaborated by the Council of Europe 
and the European Union are (broadly) consistent or equivalent. Divergence would be 
detrimental to legal certainty and predictability, and indeed to the overall European human 
rights project. For these reasons, the Charter expressly stipulates that insofar as the Charter 
contains rights that correspond to those safeguarded by the ECHR, “the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by” the ECHR (Article 52(3)). This 
reference to the ECHR includes the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.88 If the 
                                                          
83 CM/Rec(2012)3 on the protection of human rights with regard to search engines, para. 8. 
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European Union eventually accedes to the ECHR, this substantive alignment will be 
formalised and strengthened. In the same vein, insofar as the Charter recognises fundamental 
rights resulting from the constitutional traditions common to EU Member States, those rights 
shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions (Article 52(4)). 
Even though there is deliberate congruence between the ECHR and the Charter, the latter also 
purports to offer added value beyond that of the former. The following table indicates 
selected differences of approach taken under the Charter to the main rights discussed in this 
study. 
Description of right ECHR Charter Description of right 
Freedom of expression Art. 10 Art. 11 Freedom of expression and 
information 
Right to respect for private and 
family life 
Art. 8 Art. 7 Right to private and family life 
Art. 8 Right to protection of personal data 
Freedom of assembly and 
association 
Art. 11 Art. 12 Freedom of assembly and association 
Right to property Art. 1, 
Protocol 
1 
Art. 
17(2) 
Right to intellectual property 
Right to an effective remedy Art. 13 Art. 47 Right to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial Right to a fair trial Art. 6 
 
In most of these examples, the difference of approach involves a highlighting or an 
unpacking of particular principles identified in the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and their explicit recognition in a legally-binding text. Examples include the reference 
to media pluralism as part of the right to freedom of expression and the recognition of a right 
to protection of personal data as a stand-alone right (as opposed to one subsumed in a more 
general right to privacy).89 
 
Article 11 of the Charter reads: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.  
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.  
 
Article 11 of the Charter should be interpreted consistently with Article 10, ECHR, and 
relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The text of Article 11 of the 
Charter is modelled on Article 10, ECHR, but is more succinctly formulated and one of its 
purported aims is to provide a modern interpretation of Article 10, ECHR. Its added value – 
explicit mention of media freedom and pluralism – is diluted by the weak formula (“shall be 
respected”) adopted.90 By way of contrast, as will be seen below, the European Court of 
Human Rights has held that the State is the ultimate guarantor of pluralism, especially in the 
audiovisual media sector, thereby recognizing a far-reaching positive obligation for the 
                                                          
89 For commentary, see the relevant chapters in S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014, in particular: L. Woods, ‘Article 11 – Freedom of Expression and 
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State. 91  Notwithstanding the weak formulation in Article 11(2) of the Charter, there is 
currently an ostensible political interest within the EU in developing the media pluralism 
agenda.92 
 
The Charter also includes a number of relevant rights that are not (explicitly) enshrined in the 
ECHR, such as the right to protection of personal data (Art. 8), the freedom to conduct a 
business (Art. 16), the right to intellectual property (Art. 17(2)) and the right of access to 
services of general economic interest (Art. 36). These newly recognized rights and/or explicit 
emphases must be factored into the balancing of human/fundamental rights, as relevant. As 
such, they serve to adjust and expand the parameters of the balancing exercise that has 
traditionally taken place in the context of the ECHR.  
 
The right to protection of personal data has been at the heart of a string of recent judgments 
by the CJEU, which have played an important role in consolidating the fundamental nature of 
the right. In its Digital Rights Ireland judgment, for instance, the CJEU ruled that the Data 
Retention Directive93 was invalid, inter alia, because the Directive failed to lay down clear 
and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rules 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter”.94 Moreover, the Court found that the Directive 
did not “provide for sufficient safeguards, as required by Article 8 of the Charter, to ensure 
effective protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful 
access and use of” data “retained by providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks”.95  
 
Likewise, in its Schrems judgment, 96 the CJEU ruled that the European Commission’s so-
called “Safe-Harbour” Decision97 was invalid. The case concerned the ability of national 
supervisory authorities to examine “the claim of a person concerning the protection of his 
rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to him which has 
been transferred from a Member State to that third country when that person contends that the 
law and practices in force in the third country do not ensure an adequate level of protection”. 
The CJEU restated the principles that had formed the mainstay of its reasoning in its Digital 
Rights Ireland judgment.98 
 
The Google Spain judgment is another CJEU judgment that has helped to undergird the status 
of the rights to privacy and data protection, albeit in a way that: (i) departs from prior case-
law by both the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights concerning the fair balance 
principle, and (ii) is detrimental to the right to freedom of expression. The case focused on 
the question of whether a right exists to have one’s name delisted from the search results 
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Freedom and Pluralism, January 2013; responses to public consultation on the Report’s Recommendations. 
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generated by a search engine on the grounds of the rights to privacy and data protection. The 
CJEU concluded, inter alia, that:  
 
As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made 
available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, 
those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of 
the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to 
that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name.99 
 
The CJEU does countenance an exception, i.e.: “if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as 
the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental 
rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of 
its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question”.100 Nevertheless, this 
exception seems flimsy, given that the Court, after making a cursory reference to the fair 
balance between this “interest”101 and the fundamental rights of the data subject to privacy 
and data protection, went on to insist that the latter “as a rule” override the former. This 
approach gives short shrift to the right to freedom of expression, which has equal value to 
other human rights, according to the European Court of Human Rights. These critical 
arguments have been developed in greater detail elsewhere by Stefan Kulk and Frederik 
Zuiderveen Borgesius, who are also critical of one of the corollaries of the judgment, viz. that 
search engine operators have been thrust into the role of having to carry out this balancing 
exercise.102 This is an example of private ordering involving fundamental rights.    
 
The freedom to conduct a business is of particular interest in the present study due to 
potential tensions with the right to freedom of expression. The CJEU held in its Sky 
Österreich GmbH judgment that the freedom to conduct a business “is not absolute, but must 
be viewed in relation to its social function”.103 As such, it “may be subject to a broad range of 
interventions on the part of public authorities which may limit the exercise of economic 
activity in the public interest”.104 As with other rights and freedoms protected by the Charter, 
any limitation on exercise of the freedom to conduct a business “must be provided for by law 
and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, in compliance with the principle of 
proportionality, must be necessary and actually meet objectives of general interest recognised 
by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”.105 The Court 
went on to stress that the “safeguarding of the freedoms protected under Article 11 of the 
Charter undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim in the general interest [...], the importance of 
which in a democratic and pluralistic society must be stressed in particular [...]”.106 
 
Another noteworthy difference of approach between the ECHR and the Charter is that the 
former refers to the “duties and responsibilities” that govern the exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression. This is a unique provision as the reference is not part and parcel of 
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any other rights guaranteed by the ECHR. By way of contrast, Article 11 of the Charter does 
not contain an equivalent reference, but the preamble to the Charter states: “Enjoyment of 
these rights [i.e., the rights set forth in the Charter] entails responsibilities and duties with 
regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations”. This is more far-
reaching and has implications for a broader range of rights, including in an online context. 
 
The rights enshrined in the Charter must be respected in secondary EU legislation, which 
operates at a level below the Charter. The implications of this for a selection of directives 
governing the liability of online intermediaries will be examined in more detail the next sub-
section.  
 
2.2.2. The EU legal framework for intermediary liability 
 
In any Europe-focused discussion on self-regulation and privatised enforcement online, the 
EU’s legal framework on the liability of internet intermediaries cannot be omitted. Although 
it is concerned exclusively with State-imposed liability and court-ordered measures imposed 
on unwilling internet intermediaries, these provisions can nevertheless shed valuable light on 
the situation involving similar measures undertaken by such providers of their own accord. 
This section will proceed to examine the intersection of the law of fundamental rights with 
the current European enforcement framework as it pertains to public authorities, with a view 
to illuminating the situation concerning self-regulation and private enforcement. 
 
The EU has developed a piecemeal harmonised framework for intermediary liability. The 
main bulk of this can be found in its Copyright, 107  Enforcement 108  and E-Commerce 
Directives.109 While the Copyright and Enforcement Directives require Member States to 
ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for injunctions against intermediaries 
whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright, related right or other 
intellectual property right, the E-Commerce Directive sets limitations on the type of 
obligations that can be imposed on intermediaries. These Directives will be examined in 
greater detail, below. The analysis will focus mostly on legal provisions concerning the 
legality under EU law of court orders imposing injunctive measures on internet 
intermediaries for enforcement purposes, as these provide the clearest indications of the 
legality of enforcement measures undertaken voluntarily by intermediaries. It should be noted 
that the EU framework revolves primarily around intellectual property law and in particular 
copyright, however many of the conclusions drawn below will have equal applicability in 
other areas of law. The case of IP is nevertheless particularly interesting as concerns court-
ordered measures, given that, as we shall see below, Member States are obligated under EU 
law to provide IP rights holders with the possibility of applying for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property 
right. This means that the limitations that arise from fundamental rights hold strong even in 
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the face of a positive State obligation to ensure enforcement.110 At the same time, it should be 
kept in mind that, beyond the context of the harmonised European framework for injunctions 
in the enforcement of IP, national rules apply, which can result in different standards for the 
different EU Member States.  
 
Recital 59 of the Copyright Directive makes the observation that in many cases online 
intermediaries are best placed to bring infringing activities occurring on their digital premises 
to an end. On this basis, it suggests that right-holders should be given the possibility of 
applying for an injunction against any intermediary that carries a third party's infringement of 
protected work or other subject-matter in a network. Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive 
explicitly instructs Member States to “ensure that rightsholders are in a position to apply for 
an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright or related right”. The 2004 Enforcement Directive reinforces this obligation in 
Article 11 in fine, which refers to the Copyright Directive and repeats the order, expanding it 
to all intellectual property rights. Recital 23 of the latter indicates the discretion left to the 
Member States in this area regarding the exact parameters of such measures: “The conditions 
and procedures relating to such injunctions”, it says, “should be left to the national law of the 
Member States.” 
 
The E-Commerce Directive’s immunities for intermediaries do not interfere with this 
framework. Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive prohibits liability under certain clearly 
circumscribed circumstances for certain activities or functions performed by online 
intermediaries, namely “mere conduit” (Article 12), “caching” (Article 13) and “hosting” 
(Article 14). Each of these conditional liability exemptions, otherwise known as “safe 
harbour” or “immunity” provisions, is governed by a separate set of conditions that must be 
met before the intermediary may benefit. Significantly, while the provisions of the 
Enforcement and Copyright directives focus only on the infringement of intellectual property 
rights by third parties, the E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbours are cross-cutting. The safe 
harbours are thus intended to function as holistic tools, equally applicable to all different 
types of illegal online activity, from copyright or trademark infringement to unfair 
competition and from child pornography to defamation. 111  However, the E-Commerce 
Directive’s safe harbours are limited only to liability in the strict sense, i.e., for monetary 
damages. All three contain express permissions in their final paragraphs regarding the 
imposition of any kind of injunctive order on the providers of information society services by 
“courts and administrative authorities” to “terminate or prevent an infringement”. Member 
States are also permitted to establish “procedures governing the removal or disabling of 
access to information” stored by host providers.112  
 
This does not mean that all injunctive orders imposing enforcement measures against 
intermediaries are permitted: a significant limitation on the permissible scope of injunctions 
is imposed by Article 15 of the Directive, which prohibits the imposition of general 
                                                          
110 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 24 
November 2011, para. 33. 
111 It has been suggested however that the heavy reliance the E-Commerce immunities on the DMCA’s safe 
harbours does indicate a strong leaning towards the copyright perspective, see J. van Hoboken, “Legal Space for 
Innovative Ordering: On the Need to Update Selection Intermediary Liability in the EU” (2009) 13 
International Journal of Communications Law & Policy 1.  
112 Art. 14(3), E-Commerce Directive. See also, Recital 45. Article 18 also requires that Member States “ensure 
that court actions available under national law concerning information society services’ activities allow for the 
rapid adoption of measures, including interim injunctions, designed to terminate any alleged infringement and to 
prevent any further impairment of the interests involved.” 
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obligations on service providers to monitor the information which they transmit or store, or to 
actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity when providing the three safe 
harbour services. The key allowing for the reconciliation of the provisions of the three 
Directives can be found in the word “general”. Recital 47 of the E-Commerce Directive 
elucidates the meaning of the term in this context by contrasting general monitoring 
obligations with monitoring obligations imposed in a “specific case” that are issued “by 
national authorities in accordance with national legislation”. Further than this, interpretation 
has been left to the courts. Orders directed against intermediaries other than those identified 
in Articles 12-14 are not subject to the Article 15 prohibition of general monitoring orders; 
although, as the subsequent CJEU case law has demonstrated, limitations may also arise from 
the primary sources, in particular fundamental rights rules. 
 
In light of the above, it becomes clear that injunctions imposing technical measures on 
intermediaries will be difficult to keep within the boundaries of Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive. In L’Oréal v. eBay,113 a trademark case and the earliest CJEU judgment 
on injunctions against intermediaries, the Court confirmed that injunctions aimed at bringing 
an end to an infringement, as well as preventing further infringements may be imposed on 
intermediaries regardless of any liability of their own. Such injunctions must be “effective 
and dissuasive” and the national rules governing them must “designed in such a way that the 
objective pursued by the Directive may be achieved.”114 At the same time, however, the 
measures they impose must be “fair and proportionate and must not be excessively costly.”115 
They must also “not create barriers to legitimate trade”.116 This is a repetition of the lattice of 
contradictory obligations Member States must respect in the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights outlined in Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive.  
 
To reconcile these conflicting obligations, as stated in Promusicae, when several rights and 
interests are at stake, a “fair balance” must be struck.117  That ground-breaking decision dealt 
with the counter-balancing of the fundamental rights of property, including intellectual 
property (as protected by Article 17(2) of the Charter), and the right to effective judicial 
protection on the one hand (Article 47 of the Charter) and the protection of personal data and 
private life (Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter) on the other hand. The Court ruled that “the 
authorities and courts of the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a 
manner consistent with [the EU] directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an 
interpretation of them which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the 
other general principles of Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.”118 
 
What measures pass this delicate balancing test? In the twin Sabam cases, Scarlet119 and 
Netlog, 120  the CJEU took a hard stance against filtering. L’Oréal v. eBay had already 
confirmed that the active monitoring of all the data of each of the intermediary’s customers is 
excluded by Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive.121 This conclusion was then repeated in 
                                                          
113 Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, 12 July 2011. 
114 L’Oréal v eBay, para. 136. 
115 L’Oréal v eBay, para. 139. 
116 L’Oréal v eBay, para. 140. 
117 Case C-275/06, Promusicae, 29 January 2008. 
118 Promusicae, para. 68. 
119 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 24 
November 2011. 
120 Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, 
16 February 2012. 
121 L’Oréal v eBay, para. 139. 
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Scarlet. That case was an extreme one, which involved a request for the imposition, in 
defence of the claimants’ copyright, on an internet access provider of a filtering system 
geared at identifying copyright-protected works exchanged on the provider’s networks and 
blocking their transfer. Here, the Court went on to find that, even absent Article 15, such a 
burdensome request would also be illegal under the EU’s fundamental rights framework. The 
general conciliatory rule of a “fair balance” here too took central stage: after noting that 
copyright is protected under Article 17(2) of the Charter, the Court emphasised that this does 
not mean that it is inviolable and must be absolutely protected. Instead, the freedom of the 
intermediary to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter), the rights of its customers to 
the protection of their personal data (Article 8 of the Charter) and their freedom to receive 
and impart information (Article 11 of the Charter) were identified as counterbalancing rights 
that may set a limit to copyright enforcement. The Court noted that the requested injunction 
would require that ISP to install a complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own 
expense which would constitute an unreasonable interference with the intermediary’s 
freedom to conduct its business. It would also involve the systematic analysis of all content 
and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on 
the network is sent, those IP addresses being protected personal data. The interference with 
users’ freedom of information was identified on the basis that the system might not 
distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its 
introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications. The same conclusion was 
also reached a few months later in Netlog, this time with regard to a hosting service 
provider.122 
 
The two Sabam rulings were especially significant with regard to establishing fundamental 
rights as an essential part of the intermediary liability discussion and relevant criteria in 
solving the tensions between copyright and other rights and interests. They thus confirm the 
Promusicae approach of identifying the limits of enforcement not in secondary legislation, 
but in the primary sources. This raises the question of whether Article 15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive is replaceable by fundamental rights legislation: is the provision merely an explicit 
confirmation for mere conduit, caching and hosting providers of a limitation that would apply 
anyway as a result of constitutional considerations? The CJEU rulings would seem to suggest 
that this will often be the case, which in turn would mean that the restrictions of Article 15 
will often apply beyond the limited scope that it reserves for itself. In light of Scarlet, 
Dommering concluded that, beyond the vertical harmonisation that obliges Member States to 
keep their national copyright laws consistent with the harmonised EU copyright framework, 
the CJEU is aiming at a horizontal harmonisation of copyright law that places it on a level 
playing field within an autonomous EU fundamental rights framework. In this way, the 
questions of intellectual property, privacy and the free flow of information are forced to 
constantly play off each other, shuffling against one another until each slips into its natural 
resting place, which will differ in each instance, depending on the particular circumstances of 
each individual case.123  
                                                          
122 Netlog based the interference with the protection of personal data on “the identification, systematic analysis 
and processing of information connected with the profiles created on the social network by its users” that the 
requested system would involve. Such information connected with those profiles was deemed to be protected 
personal data because, in principle, it allows those users to be identified. 
123 E.J. Dommering, “De Zaak Scarlet/Sabam: Naar een Horizontale Integratie van het Auteursrecht” (2011) 2 
AMI 49. This interpretation would be in line with the current tentative reconsideration, at least among 
academics, of the internalisation of the tension between copyright and competing rights, in view of its 
escalation, brought about by the digital era, beyond the capacity of copyright’s internal safeguards, in favour of 
the construction of a broader conceptual arena where conflicting rights can openly vie against each other on 
equal terms, see L.C. Torremans, Ed., Intellectual Property and Human Rights (2nd ed.) (Wolters Kluwer, 2008); 
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It should be noted that the injunctions requested in Sabam, which would have involved the 
installation of a filtering mechanism for all electronic communications, both incoming and 
outgoing, of for all of Scarlet’s customers, in abstracto and as a preventive measure, at the 
expense of the ISP and for an unlimited period of time, were strikingly broad. The ruling does 
not provide answers with regard to orders imposing narrower filtering obligations.124 That 
said, it is hard to envision a filtering tool that would not necessarily involve general 
monitoring, particularly given that in order to be effective, filtering has to be systematic, 
universal and progressive, bringing it out of proportion with its aims.125 Filtering after all, by 
the very definition of the word, necessarily involves examining all communications in order 
to identify and “filter out” the objectionable ones. So, while in L’Oréal the Court explicitly 
permitted the imposition of measures seeking to prevent future infringements, pre-emptive 
action against illegality from unknown sources would nevertheless probably be excluded, as 
this will often amount to de facto general monitoring, there being no other way to stop 
infringing activity, the existence of which intermediaries cannot otherwise become aware of 
without outside assistance.126  
 
The Sabam rulings confirmed the conclusions drawn earlier by commentators that the 
imposition of an obligation for online intermediaries to carry out prior control by means of 
the installation of a filtering system would be of dubious legality under the EU rules. Court-
ordered filtering, although not in principle forbidden, may only be imposed after a careful 
consideration of its implications for competing rights and interests that will necessarily 
always exclude its imposition.127 It is interesting to note that this is despite the fact that the 
national legal orders are bound by an obligation to provide recourse to injunctions to IP rights 
holders. It also worth mentioning that, although the above analysis has focused on injunctive 
orders imposing enforcement measures, the same fundamental rights-derived limitations that 
exclude general monitoring will also apply to attempts by courts to impose liability for 
monetary damages on providers that do not adopt enforcement measures.  So, for example, 
the French Cour de cassation in two rulings on “L’affaire Clearstream” and “Les 
dissimulateurs” on 12 July 2012128 found that “stay-down” obligations, that result in liability 
for a provider if, following a notice of an infringement by a right holder, it does not take 
measures to prevent the future reposting of the infringing content, may not be imposed as 
they would be impossible to obey without general monitoring. Rights holders must therefore 
monitor the content of websites themselves and notify intermediaries of each new 
infringement of protected content that they detect, if they wish to have it removed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
R. Burrell and A. Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (Cambridge University Press 2005); T. 
Dreier, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’ in R. 
Dreyfuss et al., Eds., Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property – Innovation Policy for the Knowledge 
Economy (Oxford University Press 2001); P.B. Hugenholtz & M. Senftleben, “Fair Use in Europe – In Search of 
Flexibilities” (2012) Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-39. 
124 S. Kulk & F. Borgesius, “Filtering for Copyright Enforcement in Europe after the Sabam Cases” (2012) 
34(11) EIPR 791. 
125 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 14 April 2011, para. 48. 
126 T. Verbiest, G. Spindler et al., “Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries”, Markt/2006/09/E, 12 
November 2007; “EU Study on the Legal Analysis of A Single Market for the Information Society – New Rules 
for a New Age?” (November 2009), Chapter 6: “Liability of Internet Intermediaries”, available online. 
127 C. Angelopoulos, “Filtering the Internet for Copyright Content in Europe” IRIS plus 2009-4.  
128 Cour de cassation (Première chambre civile), La société Google france  c/ La société Bach films, Arrêt 
n° 831 du 12 juillet 2012; Cour de cassation (Première chambre civile) La société Google France c/ La société 
Bac films, Arrêt n° 828 du 12 juillet 2012. 
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Naturally, the fact that such broad monitoring measures are off-bounds for courts formulating 
injunctive orders does not in itself mean that intermediaries are also prohibited from 
voluntarily adopting them. Nevertheless, this analysis does suggest that caution and careful 
consideration might be necessary with regard to possible interferences by intermediaries with 
the rights of others.  
 
If general monitoring and accordingly filtering may not be imposed by State authorities on 
intermediaries, what orders may be issued against intermediaries by the courts? Following on 
the above logic, injunctions ordering the suppression of specific and clearly identifiable 
people, websites or content that have been found to contain illicit information could be 
deemed acceptable. Insightfully, in Scarlet, AG Cruz Villalón pointed out that filtering and 
blocking mechanisms, although closely related to each other as to the objectives they pursue, 
differ essentially as to their nature. They consequently carry very different legal implications 
(see the Introduction above).129 And indeed, in L’Oréal the Court suggested the suspension of 
the perpetrator of the infringement as an example of a measure that would reconcile all 
competing interests. This followed the suggestion by AG Jääskinen of a “double requirement 
of identity”, according to which where the infringing third party is the same and the right 
infringed is the same, an injunction may be issued ordering the termination of the account of 
the user in question.130 This would satisfy the balance between too lax and too aggressive an 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, between, to use the simile made by the AG, the 
Scylla of allowing the rampant infringement of copyright and the Charybdis of infringing the 
rights of users and intermediaries.131  
  
It should be noted that, even if this logic is accepted, courts must tread carefully, as even this 
suggestion is not without its problems: depending on whether the words “perpetrator” and 
“infringing third party” here are understood to refer to the actual person committing the 
infringement or simply the account they happen to hold while executing it, the measure may 
go beyond mere blocking and require filtering software that could run afoul of Article 15 of 
the E-Commerce Directive.132 It is interesting that the wording in the AG’s Opinion (“closing 
the client account of the user”) and that of the Court (“suspend the perpetrator”) suggest 
different conclusions.  
 
Other considerations should also give pause. For example, it should be noted that even mere 
blocking can have more extensive repercussions than intended: blocking entire domains, for 
example, risks collateral damage in the form of disallowing access to fully legal content that 
happens to be hosted at the same address. 133  More significantly yet, a clear distinction 
between blocking and filtering cannot be made, given that even cases of targeted and 
therefore “specific” blocking, will often necessitate the “filtering” of identifying data that 
help locate the content and differentiate it from other material may be required, if not the 
processing of the content itself. So, for instance, URL-based blocking which compares the 
website requested by the user with a pre-determined “blacklist” of URLs of objectionable 
websites will result in the indiscriminate processing of all URLs passing through the filter, 
even if only few of these are subsequently blocked. Other measures, such as the termination 
                                                          
129 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 14 April 2011, para.46.  
130 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, 9 December 2010, para. 182. 
131 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, 9 December 2010, para. 171. 
132 B. Clark & M. Schubert, “Odysseus between Scylla and Charybdis? The ECJ Rules in L’Oréal v eBay” 
(2011) 6(12) JIPLP 880. 
133 M. Horten, A Copyright Masquerade (Zed Books, 2013), p. 27. 
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of an identified user-account, will not pose such problems. Great care is needed in 
establishing that measures that might at first sight appear to be sufficiently “specific” are 
indeed so. In any case, what is clear is that if an enforcement measure is specific enough to be 
imposed on an intermediary as an injunctive order by a court, that intermediary should 
certainly be able to implement it voluntarily if it chooses.  
 
In UPC Telekabel Wien,134 the CJEU further made clear that the required specificity is limited 
to the object of the blocking order, i.e., the injunction must target identifiable websites. 
Blocking injunctions do not need to be specific with regard to the measures the intermediary 
must adopt to achieve the blocking result. Instead, the courts may leave this decision to the 
intermediary, as long as it has the opportunity to avoid coercive penalties for breach of the 
injunction by showing that it has taken all reasonable measures. In choosing such reasonable 
measures, the intermediary must make sure that it does not disproportionately infringe users’ 
rights. According to the Court, as a result of the fair balance principle, a measure taken by an 
intermediary will be reasonable if “those measures have the effect of preventing unauthorised 
access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of 
seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services of the addressee of that 
injunction from accessing the subject-matter that has been made available to them in breach 
of the intellectual property right, that being a matter for the national authorities and courts to 
establish”.135  
 
The Telekabel case is especially significant as it seems to favour a horizontal applicability of 
end-users’ fundamental rights on an internet provider’s legitimate scope of activity. 
According to the Court, “when the addressee of an injunction such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings chooses the measures to be adopted in order to comply with that injunction, he 
must ensure compliance with the fundamental right of internet users to freedom of 
information.”136 Although in the same decision the Court also insists on the importance of the 
State providing a possibility for judicial review of the implementing measures taken by the 
intermediary, this wording seems to strongly suggest that the burden of observing 
fundamental rights rests on the intermediary as well. If this interpretation is to be accepted, 
the Court’s reasoning is noteworthy: although starting from an examination of the submitted 
request for a preliminary ruling on the extent of the negative obligations incumbent on the 
courts as public authorities to refrain from vertically imposing injunctions on intermediaries 
that infringe either their own rights or those of their users, the CJEU jumps to the horizontal 
obligation of the intermediary itself to respect the fundamental rights of others – a paradigm 
shift quite remarkable in its breadth. According to this thinking, internet access providers 
cannot act indiscriminately with regard to enforcement measures, but must take into account 
the fundamental rights of end-users, including their rights to freedom of expression and 
privacy. This obligation persists, irrespective of the fact that they are also under an obligation 
to adopt an enforcement measure as a result of the injunction imposed on them, just as, as 
noted above, public authorities are obliged to respect fundamental rights of users and 
intermediaries, while also owing right-holders injunctive relief under EU law. The “fair 
balance” first identified in Promusicae must therefore be respected not only by the State, as 
follows naturally from the negative dimension of fundamental rights, but also by private 
entities, at least following a court order to take a measure that has the potential to interfere 
with the free exercise of the fundamental rights of third parties. No explanation is given 
regarding the interference of such obligations with the intermediary’s freedom to conduct a 
                                                          
134 Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 27 March 2014.  
135 Telekabel, para. 64. 
136 Telekabel, para. 55. 
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business or what the consequences for an intermediary of a court finding of an interference 
with a user’s right might be. For the privatised enforcement and self-regulation, if this 
interpretation is correct, it cannot be seen as anything short of ground-breaking: the Court has 
effectively turned vertical effect into horizontal effect, thereby blasting open the doors from 
the direct application of fundamental rights on relationships between private parties.  
 
Of course, it should be noted that the issue is a complex one, particularly in view of the fact 
that private entities can themselves claim protection under the fundamental rights framework 
(e.g., the protection of property and the freedom to conduct a business).   
 
 
  
33 
 
 
3. Positive State obligations 
3.1. Origins of the doctrine 
 
The international legal system for the protection of human rights pivots on the linear 
relationship between individuals (rights-holders) and States (duty-bearers). The recognition 
that different types of non-State/private actors should also be (explicitly) positioned within 
the system has come about in a gradual and frictional manner. And even that reluctant 
recognition has only been achieved through the dynamic interpretation of existing legal 
norms and the interplay between those norms and policy-making documents. 
 
All international human rights treaties share the primary objective of ensuring that the rights 
enshrined therein are rendered effective for everyone. There is also a predominant tendency 
in international treaty law to guarantee effective remedies to individuals when their human 
rights have been violated. In order to achieve these dual objectives, it is not always enough 
for the State to simply refrain from interfering with individuals’ human rights: positive or 
affirmative action will often be required as well. It is therefore important to acknowledge the 
concomitance of negative and positive State obligations to safeguard human rights. While 
this acknowledgement typically informs treaty-interpretation, relevant formulae and 
approaches tend to vary per treaty.  
 
So, in the context of online intermediary self-regulation as well, in addition to the traditional 
negative obligations that bind public authorities, the positive obligations of the State to 
safeguard human rights can mean that public authorities may be obligated to prevent private 
parties from engaging in different types of behaviour that endanger the fundamental rights of 
third parties. This can result in restrictions by public authorities on the use of self-regulation 
as a regulatory paradigm for the online environment. 
  
In the following sections, a sample of international treaties (i.e., the ECHR and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)) will be surveyed to illustrate 
the different but comparable approaches to ensure that human rights are effective in practice, 
to the extent that these are relevant to the question of online enforcement through self-
regulation. 
 
3.2. The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The questions of whether or how international human rights treaties protect individuals 
against the actions of other private persons do not invite straightforward answers. A leading 
textbook on the ECHR captures the conceptual difficulties involved when it cautions against 
describing such protection (in the context of the ECHR) as Drittwirkung, a doctrine under 
which “an individual may rely upon a national bill of rights to bring a claim against a private 
person who has violated his rights under that instrument”.137 Such a “horizontal application of 
law […] can have no application under the Convention at the international level, because the 
                                                          
137 (footnote omitted) D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E.P. Bates & C. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (3rd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 23. 
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Convention is a treaty that imposes obligations only upon states”.138 It further clarifies that 
“insofar as the Convention touches the conduct of private persons, it does so only indirectly 
through such positive obligations as it imposes upon a state”.139   
 
Article 1, ECHR, obliges States Parties to the Convention to “secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” set out in the Convention. The obligation to “secure” 
these rights is unequivocal and necessarily involves ensuring that the rights in question are 
not “theoretical or illusory”, but “practical and effective” (see above). Against this backdrop 
and based on an analysis of the Court’s relevant case-law, it has been observed that “various 
forms of positive obligations have been imposed upon different governmental bodies in order 
to secure a realistic guarantee of Convention rights and freedoms”. 140  What exactly a 
“realistic guarantee” entails is best determined on a case-by-case basis, although certain 
trends can tentatively be identified per Convention article. The following examples concern 
Articles 8, 11 and 10, ECHR. 
 
In its Airey judgment, the Court stated that “although the object of Article 8 is essentially that 
of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not 
merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for 
private or family life”.141 In X. & Y. v. The Netherlands, it supplemented that statement by 
admitting that such “obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves”.142 This is an important extension of the principle as articulated in anterior case-
law; it confirms a degree of horizontal applicability of relevant rights. Yet, the Court “does 
not consider it desirable, let alone necessary, to elaborate a general theory concerning the 
extent to which the Convention guarantees should be extended to relations between private 
individuals inter se”.143 Instead, it seems to prefer the case-by-case approach that has come to 
typify its jurisprudence. 
 
The Court has deliberately adopted similar reasoning regarding the right to freedom of 
assembly; it held that “genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly” cannot: 
 
be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely 
negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of 
Article 11. Like Article 8, Article 11 sometimes requires positive measures to be 
taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need be [...]144 
 
The pattern of recognising that positive State duties are sometimes necessary in order to 
render rights effective can also be detected in respect of Article 10. Such positive State duties 
apply to substantive and procedural matters alike. For instance, when negligibly-funded 
informational campaigns aiming to influence debate on matters of public interest are pitted 
against multinational corporations which have vastly superior financial resources, procedural 
                                                          
138 (footnotes omitted) Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 A. Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 5: 1 
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fairness requires that some approximate equality of arms be strived for. In the Court’s own 
words:  
 
If, however, a State decides to provide such a remedy [against defamation] to a 
corporate body, it is essential, in order to safeguard the countervailing interests in 
free expression and open debate, that a measure of procedural fairness and 
equality of arms is provided for.145 
 
Although the Court does not spell out the implications of its pronouncement, it seems logical 
that it would be for the State to guarantee the requisite measure of procedural fairness and 
equality of arms. 
 
As regards more substantive concerns, the Court has accepted in principle that positive 
measures may be required of States in order to give effect to the right to freedom of 
expression (as with Articles 8 and 11, including the protection of the right in the sphere of 
relations between individuals 146 ), but it has yet to meaningfully explore the practical 
workings of the principle. For instance, in Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, taking as its starting 
point, “the key importance of freedom of expression as one of the preconditions for a 
functioning democracy”, the Court recognised that:  
 
Genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State's 
duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the 
sphere of relations between individuals [...]. In determining whether or not a 
positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be 
struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the 
individual, the search for which is inherent throughout the Convention.147  
 
This recognition amounts to an important statement of principle, even if the Court does 
immediately go on to concede: 
 
The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of 
situations obtaining in Contracting States, the difficulties involved in policing 
modern societies and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and 
resources. Nor must such an obligation be interpreted in such a way as to impose 
an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities [...].148  
 
Owing to the situational diversity across the Council of Europe, States Parties to the ECHR 
“enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure 
compliance with the Convention”, subject to the practical and effective doctrine.149   
 
In its Informationsverein Lentia judgment, the European Court of Human Rights found, 
seminally, that the State is the ultimate guarantor of pluralism, especially in the audiovisual 
media sector.150 The implications of this positive obligation have since been teased out, most 
                                                          
145 Steel & Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, ECHR 2005-II, para. 95. 
146 See, among other authorities, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, no. 39293/98, 29 February 2000, para. 38. 
147 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, ECHR 2000-III, para. 43. 
148 Ibid. See also VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, ECHR 2009, paras. 
81 and 82. 
149 Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, op. cit., para. 55. 
150 Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, para. 38. 
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notably in Verein gegen Tierfabriken151 and in Manole & Others v. Moldova.152 In Verein 
gegen Tierfabriken, for instance, the Court held that: 
 
It is true that powerful financial groups can obtain competitive advantages in the 
areas of commercial advertising and may thereby exercise pressure on, and 
eventually curtail the freedom of, the radio and television stations broadcasting 
the commercials. Such situations undermine the fundamental role of freedom of 
expression in a democratic society as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, 
in particular where it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, 
which the public is moreover entitled to receive. Such an undertaking cannot be 
successfully accomplished unless it is grounded in the principle of pluralism of 
which the State is the ultimate guarantor. This observation is especially valid in 
relation to audio-visual media, whose programmes are often broadcast very 
widely. 
 
It is important to note in this connection the Court’s express linking of freedom of expression, 
democratic society, pluralism and “especially” the audio-visual media, “whose programmes 
are often broadcast very widely”. If the reason for singling out the audiovisual media is the 
wide reach of their programmes, then these arguments clearly apply mutatis mutandis to the 
Internet.  
 
Notwithstanding the potential of the State’s role as the ultimate guarantor of pluralism in 
democratic society, the positive obligations engendered by that role do not extend to 
guaranteeing “freedom of forum” 153  or access to a particular medium/service. 154  In 
Melnychuk v. Ukraine, in which a particular form of access - the right of reply, the Court 
noted that “as a general principle, newspapers and other privately-owned media must be free 
to exercise editorial discretion in deciding whether to publish articles, comments and letters 
submitted by private individuals”. 155  It acknowledged that, against this background, 
“exceptional circumstances” may nevertheless arise “in which a newspaper may legitimately 
be required to publish, for example, a retraction, an apology or a judgment in a defamation 
case”.156 Situations such as these may, according to the Court, create a positive obligation 
“for the State to ensure an individual’s freedom of expression in such media”.157 
 
In Appleby & others v. the United Kingdom, the applicants argued that the shopping centre to 
which they sought to gain access should be regarded as a “quasi-public” space because it was 
de facto a forum for communication. The Court held that: 
 
[Article 10, ECHR], notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of freedom of 
expression, does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of that right. 
While it is true that demographic, social, economic and technological 
developments are changing the ways in which people move around and come into 
                                                          
151 VgT, op. cit., para. 73. 
152 Manole and  Others v. Moldova, no. 13936/02, ECHR 2009. See, in particular, paras. 98 and 107. 
153 Appleby & Others v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., para. 47. 
154 Haider v. Austria, no. 25060/94, 18 October 1995; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd. v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.), no. 44802/98, 7 November 2000, Demuth v. Switzerland, no. 38743/97, ECHR 2002-IX; VgT v. 
Switzerland. 
155 Melnychuk v. Ukraine, Decision of inadmissibility of the European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) 
of 5 July 2005. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
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contact with each other, the Court is not persuaded that this requires the automatic 
creation of rights of entry to private property, or even, necessarily, to all publicly-
owned property (Government offices and ministries, for instance). Where 
however the bar on access to property has the effect of preventing any effective 
exercise of freedom of expression or it can be said that the essence of the right 
has been destroyed, the Court would not exclude that a positive obligation could 
arise for the State to protect the enjoyment of Convention rights by regulating 
property rights.158 
 
Instead, the Court tends to place store by the existence of viable expressive alternatives to the 
particular one denied. In determining whether alternative expressive opportunities are 
actually viable in the circumstances of a given case, it is important to be mindful of the 
Court’s Khurshid Mustafa & Tarzibachi judgment, 159  in which it correctly rejected the 
assumption that different media are functionally equivalent. Different media have different 
purposes and are used differently by different individuals and groups in society: they are not 
necessarily interchangeable.160 This is one explanation of why different media are subject to 
different regulatory regimes.161 
 
Further, as regards the viability of an expressive opportunity, it should be recalled that the 
Court has held (in respect of the right to freedom of association) that an “individual does not 
enjoy the right [to freedom of association] if in reality the freedom of action or choice which 
remains available to him is either non-existent or so reduced as to be of no practical value”.162 
This finding, which could be applied analogously to the right to freedom of expression, is 
another illustration of the Court’s commitment to its “practical and effective” doctrine. 
 
In light of the Khurshid Mustafa & Tarzibachi judgment, the Court tends to consider whether 
the blocking of access to a particular medium or forum has the effect of depriving someone of 
a major source of communication and thereby the possibility of participating in public 
debate.163 The Court thus found no breach of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression in 
Akdeniz v. Turkey after access to two music-streaming websites was blocked on the ground 
that they were in breach of copyright. The reasoning was that the applicant in the case could 
“without difficulty have had access to a range of musical works by numerous means without 
this entailing a breach of copyright rules”.164 Again, the availability of viable expressive 
alternatives (or, in casu viable alternatives for receiving information) was a central 
consideration for the Court. The case was distinguished from Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 
(discussed above) as it involved copyright and commercial speech, as opposed to political 
speech and the ability to participate in public debate. Member States have a wider margin of 
appreciation for commercial speech than for political speech.  
 
In Cengiz & others v. Turkey, the Court distinguished Akdeniz and re-affirmed the reasoning 
behind its Ahmet Yildirim judgment. The Cengiz case concerned the blocking of the YouTube 
                                                          
158 (emphasis added) Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., para. 47. 
159 Khurshid Mustafa & Tarzibachi v. Sweden, no. 23883/06, 16 December 2008, para. 45. 
160 For further analysis, see: T. McGonagle, ‘The Council of Europe’s standards on access to the media for 
minorities: A tale of near misses and staggered successes’, in Amos, M., Harrison, J. & Woods, L., Eds., 
Freedom of Expression and the Media (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 111-140, at 118-
124. 
161 See, as regards Internet, Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, op. cit. 
162 Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, Series A, no. 44, 13 August 1981, para. 56. 
163 Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 20877/10, 11 March 2014. 
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website in Turkey in 2008. This deprived the applicants, who are academics, of an important 
source of information and ideas and an important outlet for their academic work. As in its 
Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi judgment, the Court recognized that particular media can 
provide types of information that are of particular interest to certain (categories of) 
persons.165 The Court accepted that, given the specific features of YouTube and how the 
applicants used it, there was no equivalent platform available to them as a result of the 
blocking measures.166 The Court found that while the applicants were not directly targeted by 
the blocking measures, there had nevertheless been an interference with their right to receive 
and communicate information and ideas.167 This collateral effect of the impugned measures 
was an important consideration for the Court in reaching its conclusion that the applicants’ 
right to freedom of expression had been violated.  
 
Perhaps the most far-reaching positive obligation in relation to freedom of expression to be 
identified by the Court to date concerns the enablement of freedom of expression in a very 
broad sense. In Dink v. Turkey, the Court stated that States are required to create a favourable 
environment for participation in public debate for everyone and to enable the expression of 
ideas and opinions without fear. 168  This finding bridges protective and promotional 
obligations and it contains great potential for further development, including in respect of 
online communication. Fear, for example of legal liability for third-party content on a hosting 
provider, can give rise to a chilling effect on free speech and a restriction on public debate. It 
has been noted that States should, to “comply fully” with Article 10, ECHR, “ensure that they 
do not place intermediaries under such fear of liability claims that they come to impose on 
themselves filtering that is appropriate for making them immune to any subsequent 
accusation but is of a kind that threatens the freedom of expression of Internet users”.169 
 
Reviewing the foregoing, it can be observed that the Court’s recognition of positive State 
obligations in respect of communication rights is nascent and piecemeal, but steady. The 
process of recognition will continue to be guided by the living instrument doctrine and the 
practical and effective doctrine. It will also be driven by the Court’s gradual but growing 
appreciation of the specificities of the online communications environment. At present, the 
criteria applied by the Court in determining whether a State has failed to honour specific 
positive obligations remain somewhat unclear, thus making the following clarification very 
welcome: 
 
the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the 
Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable 
principles are nonetheless similar. Whether the case is analysed in terms of a 
positive duty on the State or in terms of interference by a public authority which 
needs to be justified, the criteria to be applied do not differ in substance. In both 
contexts regard must be had to the fair balance to be struck between the 
competing interests at stake.170 
  
                                                          
165 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, op. cit., § 51. 
166 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, op. cit., § 52. 
167 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, op. cit., § 64. 
168 Dink v. Turkey, nos. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09, 14 September 2010, para. 137. 
169 E. Montero and Q. Van Enis, “Enabling freedom of expression in light of filtering measures imposed on 
Internet intermediaries: Squaring the circle”, Computer Law & Security Review 27 (2011) 21-35, at 34. 
170 VgT (No. 2), op. cit., para. 82. See also Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, 
ECHR 2012, para. 99. 
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The practical implications of this finding will be teased out in Section 3.4, below. That 
section will specifically address the question: what positive obligations do States have in 
respect of interferences with individual communication rights by private parties? First, 
though, attention will turn to the development of the positive obligations doctrine in the 
context of the ICCPR.  
 
3.3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
Under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, 171  States Parties must “respect” and “ensure” to all 
individuals subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant in a non-
discriminatory manner. The obligation undertaken by States Parties is therefore twofold. First, 
“to respect” all of the rights recognised in the ICCPR, States must not violate them. Second, 
“to ensure” those rights is a more far-reaching undertaking and, according to one leading 
commentator, it “implies an affirmative obligation by the state to take whatever measures are 
necessary to enable individuals to enjoy or exercise the rights guaranteed in the Covenant, 
including the removal of governmental and possibly also some private obstacles to the 
enjoyment of these rights”.172 The reading of affirmative State obligations into Article 2, 
ICCPR, is borne out by subsequent paragraphs of the Article and the interpretive 
clarifications offered, inter alia, by the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 
No. 31 – “The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant”. 
 
Article 2(2) requires States “to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant”. 
This requirement is “unqualified and of immediate effect”.173 In addition, pursuant to Article 
2(3), States “must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to 
vindicate those rights”.174 The envisaged remedies “should be appropriately adapted so as to 
take account of the special vulnerability of certain categories of person […]”.175 
 
Specifically regarding the right to freedom of expression (as enshrined in Article 19, ICCPR), 
the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 states: 
 
The obligation to respect freedoms of opinion and expression is binding on every 
State party as a whole. All branches of the State (executive, legislative and 
judicial) and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level – 
national, regional or local – are in a position to engage the responsibility of the 
State party. Such responsibility may also be incurred by a State party under some 
                                                          
171 It reads: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.” 
172 T. Buergenthal, “To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations”, in L. Henkin, Ed., 
The International Bill of Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 72-91, at 77. Buergenthal 
also notes that such affirmative obligations could include “providing some access to places and media for public 
assembly or expression” – ibid. 
173 General Comment No. 31 [80] – “The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant”, 29 March 2004, para. 14. 
174 Ibid., para. 15. 
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circumstances in respect of acts of semi-State entities. The obligation also 
requires States parties to ensure that persons are protected from any acts by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of the freedoms of 
opinion and expression to the extent that these Covenant rights are amenable to 
application between private persons or entities.176 
 
Although the terms “positive obligations” and “affirmative action” do not appear in the text 
of General Comment No. 34, the last sentence in the cited passage, above, is unambiguous: in 
certain circumstances, States may have a positive obligation to take measures to prevent 
violations of individuals’ right to freedom of expression by third parties. In light of the 
General Comment’s repeated insistence that the scope of the right of freedom of expression 
extends to all forms of online communication, 177  there is no doubt that positive State 
obligations arise in respect of Internet-based communication. 
 
In respect of the right to privacy (as enshrined in Article 17, ICCPR), the Human Rights 
Committee is even more emphatic about the existence and extent of States’ positive 
obligations, including in the sphere of individual relations. The opening paragraph of the 
Committee’s General Comment No. 16 reads as follows: 
 
Article 17 provides for the right of every person to be protected against arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence as well 
as against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. In the view of the 
Committee this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences 
and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal 
persons. The obligations imposed by this article require the State to adopt 
legislative and other measures to give effect to the prohibition against such 
interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of this right.178 
 
The General Comment further states that “States parties are under a duty themselves not to 
engage in interferences inconsistent with article 17 of the Covenant and to provide the 
legislative framework prohibiting such acts by natural or legal persons”.179 Additionally, as 
“Article 17 affords protection to personal honour and reputation”, States are under an 
obligation to “provide adequate legislation to that end”.180 The importance of redress is also 
stressed in this connection: “Provision must also be made for everyone effectively to be able 
to protect himself against any unlawful attacks that do occur and to have an effective remedy 
against those responsible”.181 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the concept of positive State obligations is well-consolidated in 
the context of the ICCPR, both in theory and in practice, even if the precise term is not used. 
 
 
                                                          
176 (footnotes omitted) UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion 
and Expression), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, para. 7. 
177 See, for example, paras. 12, 15, 43-45. 
178 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 – Doc. No. A/43/40, 28 September 
1988, para. 1. See also para. 6. 
179 (emphasis added) Ibid., para. 9. 
180 Ibid., para. 11. 
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3.4. What positive obligations do States have in respect of interferences 
with individual communication rights by private parties? 
 
3.4.1. The European human rights framework 
 
As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections, the positive obligations doctrine has developed 
by accretion and its precise scope and finer details continue to evolve. Besides the doctrinal 
evolution in the case-law of the ECtHR, it is also instructive to consider the potential 
guidance offered by relevant standard-setting work by the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers and relevant case law of the CJEU. For analytical purposes, it is useful to group 
positive State obligations relating to communication rights online into three categories: 
preventive, promotional and remedial. These categories are not, however, mutually exclusive. 
As will be shown, preventive and promotional obligations, for example, overlap to an extent. 
 
3.4.1.1 Preventive obligations 
 
States are required to put in place regulatory frameworks (including legislative frameworks) 
to ensure the effective exercise of communication rights in the online environment. These 
frameworks should include legislative frameworks182 and, more specifically, criminal-law 
frameworks, as appropriate, for instance for combating child pornography.183 In respect of 
medical data, which constitutes “highly intimate and sensitive” data, States must ensure that 
the law affords “practical and effective protection to exclude any possibility of unauthorised 
access” to such data.184 States must ensure that laws not only meet the Sunday Times criteria 
concerning the quality of law (foreseeability and accessibility), 185  but in particular for 
surveillance of communications, for example, additional criteria apply in the interests of 
transparency/avoiding chilling effect and to ensure safeguards against various possible 
abuses.186 
 
The obligations described in the previous paragraph exist regardless of the existence of self-
regulatory mechanisms. While States may enjoy discretion as to the means they use to fulfil 
their fundamental rights obligations, they may not delegate those obligations to private 
parties.187 Relatedly, these obligations also exist regardless of States’ obligations under other 
international treaties, especially when source of those obligations is an international 
                                                          
182 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, op. cit. 
183 K.U. v. Finland, op. cit. 
184 I. v. Finland, no. 20511/03, §§ 38, 39 and 47, 17 July 2008; Z. v. Finland, judgment of 25 February 1997, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, §§ 95-96. 
185 See also in this connection, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommendation 16 
(2014). 
186 See, in particular, Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), no. 54934/00, § 95, ECHR 2006-XI (which 
summarizes “the minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power”), 
and generally: Klaas v. Germany, 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269; Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, 
Series A no. 176-A; Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82. For a detailed discussion 
of these issues, see: S. Eskens, O. van Daalen and N. van Eijk, Ten standards for oversight and transparency of 
national intelligence services, Amsterdam, Institute for Information Law (IViR), 2015. 
187 Woś v. Poland, no. 22860/02, ECHR 2006-VII, Michaud v. France, no. 12323/11, ECHR 2012; consider also 
Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, Series A no. 90, Peck v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., Fuentes Bobo, op. 
cit. 
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organisation with “equivalent” levels of human rights protection. 188  Thus, EU-law (for 
example) may neither displace nor dilute positive State obligations identified and developed 
by the ECtHR pursuant to the ECHR. 
 
3.4.1.2 Promotional obligations  
 
States also have positive obligations to actively promote different values, such as pluralistic 
tolerance in society and media pluralism. Whereas the role of the State as “ultimate 
guarantor” of media pluralism has traditionally concerned the audiovisual media sector,189 it 
is likely – in light of the living instrument and practical and effective doctrines, that this 
principle will have to be developed and applied mutatis mutandis to the online environment. 
Similarly, States’ positive obligation to ensure an environment that is favourable to freedom 
of expression190 necessitates adaptation for optimal realization in the online environment. 
Etienne Montero and Quentin Van Enis have posited that States’ positive obligations, when 
“[t]ransposed to the digital universe”, include the adoption of “a genuinely reassuring 
framework for intermediaries in order to avoid the private censorship they are liable to effect 
through fear of liability action”.191    
 
3.4.1.3 Remedial obligations 
 
Review and redress are also important elements of States positive obligations to uphold 
communication rights in an online environment. In accordance with Article 13, ECHR, States 
must, first and foremost, ensure that effective remedies are available for violations of 
communication rights. Remedies should have corrective, compensatory, investigative and 
punitive functions and effects. These obligations mean that States must ensure that alleged 
violations of communication rights by private parties are subject to independent and impartial 
judicial review.192 Such review would necessarily consider the extent to which policies and 
practices of private actors, e.g., for blocking and filtering content, show due regard for 
process values such as transparency and accountability, as well as respect for rule of law.193 
 
3.4.1.4 General guidance 
 
Primary guidance for ongoing attempts to clarify the scope and content of States’ positive 
obligations to guarantee the effective exercise of communication rights in an online 
environment is provided by the ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR. In that context, the 
ECtHR has stated that the legitimate aims of restrictions on, for example, the rights to privacy 
and freedom of expression (as set out in Articles 8(2) and 10(2)) may be relevant for 
assessing whether States have failed to honour relevant positive obligations.194 The ECtHR 
has also found that the margin of appreciation is, in principle, the same for Articles 8 and 10, 
ECHR. 195  In all cases involving competing rights guaranteed by the Convention, a fair 
                                                          
188Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI; 
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191 E. Montero and Q. Van Enis, “Enabling freedom of expression in light of filtering measures imposed on 
Internet intermediaries: Squaring the circle”, op. cit., at 24. 
192 See also in this connection, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommendation 16 
(2014). 
193 See, e.g., Peck v. the United Kingdom, op. cit. 
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balance has to be struck between the rights involved, as relevant for the particular 
circumstances of the case. However, when restrictions are imposed on a right or freedom 
guaranteed by the ECHR, in order to protect “rights and freedoms” which are not guaranteed 
by the ECHR, the ECtHR has insisted that “only indisputable imperatives can justify 
interference with enjoyment of a Convention right”.196 
 
The CJEU generally takes a similar “fair balance” approach to that of the ECtHR and has 
arguably gone so far as to extend the need for private parties to strike a fair balance between 
competing fundamental rights whenever their activities or omissions interfere with those 
rights.197 
 
3.4.1.5 Specific guidance 
 
In their case-law, the ECtHR and the CJEU tend to give guidance of a general nature to States 
about the nature and scope of their positive obligations. Specific guidance, therefore, usually 
has to be sought elsewhere or inferred from other sources, for instance Declarations and 
Recommendations adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and 
Directives adopted by the European Union. Although such sources of specific guidance are 
typically policy or political texts and are therefore not legally-binding on States, their 
influence can be persuasive. They can explore the ramifications of principles beyond the 
immediate context of the given set of factual circumstances in which the principles have been 
identified. 
 
Specific guidance can also be gleaned from ongoing efforts at the global level to sensitize 
corporate entities to their human rights responsibilities and the relationship between 
traditional legal obligations of States and those corporate responsibilities. Although (the 
practical impact or effectiveness of) such initiatives are sometimes met with scepticism, their 
relevance stems from the architecture of international law that generally creates formal legal 
obligations for States, but not for private (corporate) entities.    
 
3.4.2. The United Nations framework 
 
In recent years, a campaign to strengthen corporate respect for human rights has achieved 
considerable traction within the United Nations system. It has generated a powerful political 
dynamic, even if it has not (yet) led to new legally-binding standards. A selection of key 
reference points in the campaign will now be sketched, in particular the UN Global Compact 
and the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights. 
These initiatives and their implementation are making steady inroads into European-level 
policy-making on relevant issues.198 The Global Network Initiative (GNI), which has a more 
specific focus on information and communications technologies (ICT), will then briefly be 
reviewed as well. 
 
3.4.2.1 The UN Global Compact 
 
                                                          
196 Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 113, ECHR 1999-III. 
197 See the analysis of the UPC Telekabel Wien judgment, above. 
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The UN Global Compact styles itself as the world’s largest corporate responsibility initiative. 
It is a voluntary initiative, based on CEO commitments to align business operations and 
strategies with ten principles which have been distilled from selected international 
instruments spanning the subject areas: human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption.199 The first two principles focus on human rights: 
 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
 
These two principles represented very important inclusions in the Compact when it was 
launched in 2000. Since then, while the importance of the principles has not diminished, their 
development and promotion have been increasingly assured by the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights.  
 
3.4.2.2 UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights 
 
The Framework, loosely inspired by the “respect, protect, fulfil” approach, is set out (inter 
alia) in a very influential report written by Prof. John Ruggie in his capacity as (former) 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The Framework recognises that 
there are problematic “institutional misalignments in the business and human rights domain” 
(para. 7) and accordingly seeks to offer guidance on how to fill the normative gaps that result 
from those misalignments. It addresses “all social actors”: “States, businesses, and civil 
society” and their need for a “common conceptual and policy framework” (para. 8).  
 
The structure of the Framework is triangular: it comprises three complementary, mutually-
supporting principles. Each of the principles is alluded to in its title: the state duty to protect; 
the corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedies (emphasis added).  
 
State protection 
 
States’ duty to protect human rights comprises four main prongs. First, governments should 
foster corporate cultures in which respecting rights is an integral part of business activity 
(para. 29). Second, States should enhance policy alignment when it comes to the 
implementation of their human rights obligations. In other words, they should enhance the 
(vertical) coherence of the implementation of the their obligations under international human 
rights law, and the (horizontal) coherence of the implementation of their obligations by 
coordinating cross-agency responsibility for the same (para. 33). The third prong concerns the 
international level and the guidance and support that treaty bodies and special procedures can 
give States on implementing their obligations to protect rights vis-à-vis corporate activities 
(para. 43). The fourth and final prong concerns special measures for conflict zones (paras. 47 
et seq.). 
 
Corporate responsibility 
 
The notion of corporate responsibility to respect human rights is explored from four main 
angles: respecting rights, due diligence, sphere of influence and complicity. 
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- Respecting rights 
 
The responsibility to respect human rights is the “baseline expectation for all companies in all 
situations”, although companies may incur additional responsibilities, for example, when they 
perform certain public functions or have voluntarily entered into additional commitments 
(para. 24). The separateness but complementarity of corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights and States’ duty to protect them is crucial: 
 
The corporate responsibility to respect exists independently of States’ duties. 
Therefore, there is no need for the slippery distinction between “primary” State 
and “secondary” corporate obligations - which in any event would invite endless 
strategic gaming on the ground about who is responsible for what. [...]200  
 
- Due diligence  
 
In order to respect human rights, companies must exercise due diligence, which entails, first, 
deriving benchmarks for their activities from key international human rights instruments. It 
also entails developing a due diligence process that should include: policies, impact 
assessments, integration [of human rights policies throughout a company], tracking 
performance. Due diligence therefore comprises substantive and procedural elements. 
 
- Sphere of influence 
 
The notion of sphere of influence looks at the impact of companies’ activities and 
relationships on human rights beyond the workplace. The term “conflates two very different 
meanings of influence: one is impact, where the company’s activities or relationships are 
causing human rights harm; the other is whatever leverage a company may have over actors 
that are causing harm.” (para. 68). The latter only falls under the company’s responsibility to 
respect in particular circumstances. 
 
- Complicity 
 
This notion refers to “indirect involvement by companies in human rights abuses - where the 
actual harm is committed by another party, including governments and non-State actors” 
(para. 73), eg. the facilitation of unlawful State surveillance of individuals by Internet service 
providers or telecommunications operators. Complicity is generally made up of two elements: 
 
1. An act or omission (failure to act) by a company, or individual representing a 
company, that “helps” (facilitates, legitimizes, assists, encourages, etc.) another, in 
some way, to carry out a human rights abuse, and 
2. The knowledge by the company that its act or omission could provide such help. 
 
Furthermore, it can take different forms: 
 
- Direct complicity — when a company provides goods or services that it knows will 
be used to carry out the abuse. 
                                                          
200 (para. 55). See also para. 70. See further: The Importance of Voluntarism (2009): 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/Voluntarism_Importance.pdf.  
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- Beneficial complicity — when a company benefits from human rights abuses even if 
it did not positively assist or cause them. 
- Silent complicity — when the company is silent or inactive in the face of systematic 
or continuous human rights abuse. [...] 
 
Access to remedies 
 
“Effective grievance mechanisms” are identified as being of central importance in the context 
of both the State duty to protect human rights and the corporate responsibility to protect 
human rights. Again, the separateness and complementarity of State and corporate 
approaches is stressed and it is also posited that non-state mechanisms “can offer additional 
opportunities for recourse and redress” (para. 86). A number of different types of 
mechanisms are itemised, including: judicial, non-judicial; company-level and multi-
stakeholder or industry initiatives and financiers. 
 
Non-judicial grievance mechanisms should be, at a minimum: legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, rights-compatible and transparent (para. 92). The degree to which a 
non-judicial grievance mechanism adheres to these principles is one measure of its credibility 
and effectiveness. As such, these principles could have a useful benchmarking function.  
 
They should include in-built safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest whenever the company 
is directly involved in administering a mechanism, eg. by focusing on direct or mediated 
dialogue, with oversight structures, etc. Crucially, the report insists that these mechanisms 
“should not negatively impact opportunities for complainants to seek recourse through State-
based mechanisms, including the courts” (para. 95). 
 
Such mechanisms could offer a range of different types of redress to aggrieved parties: 
compensation, restitution, guarantees of non-repetition, changes in relevant law and public 
apologies.  
 
Synopsis 
 
Much of the value of Ruggie’s report lies in how it prises open the traditional parameters of 
international human rights law and clarifies the “interloper” position of private/corporate 
actors in that underexplored legal terrain. Moreover, the report does not limit itself to the 
identification and explanation of principles; it also makes considerable efforts to set out how 
those principles could be operationalised. The unpacking of key concepts is designed to 
advance the goal of operationalisation. The report contains the germ of subsequent 
documents (also developed under Ruggie’s stewardship): Guiding principles on business and 
human rights: Implementing the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework; 
The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide. 
 
3.4.2.3 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
 
As of this writing, the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, had announced a new project “to study the 
responsibilities of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector to protect 
and promote freedom of expression in the digital age”.201 This project will examine, inter alia, 
                                                          
201 See further: http://ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/Privatesectorinthedigitalage.aspx.  
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the relationship between corporate responsibilities of ICT companies and the right to freedom 
of expression. According to a call for submissions on the Special Rapporteur’s website, the 
initial phase of the project will be a mapping exercise, which will be the focus of the Special 
Rapporteur’s report to the UN Human Rights Council in June 2016. The call for submissions 
provides further information about the initial phase of the project as follows: 
 
During the initial phase of the project until the spring of 2016, the Special 
Rapporteur will prepare a study that maps 1) the categories of actors in the ICT 
sector whose activities implicate the freedom of opinion and expression; 2) the 
main legal issues raised for freedom of opinion and expression within the ICT 
sector; and 3) the conceptual and normative work already done to develop 
corporate responsibility and human rights frameworks in these spaces, including 
governmental, inter-governmental, civil society, corporate and multistakeholder 
efforts. This report will also identify the work plan and objectives for the duration 
of the project.202 
 
3.4.3. Self-regulatory initiatives 
 
3.4.3.1 Global Network Initiative (GNI) 
 
The GNI is the most prominent global effort towards self-regulation in the ICT sector. It 
includes amongst its participants ICT-companies such as Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, 
Microsoft and Yahoo! Its other participants are from, inter alia, civil society and academia, 
such as Human Rights Watch and Harvard’s Berkman Centre.203 Founded in 2008, the GNI 
established a set of principles on privacy and freedom of expression, which were translated 
into more concrete policy recommendations in its Implementation Guidelines. 204  The 
Principles, which are based on international human rights standards, have as their key 
focuses: freedom of expression, privacy, responsible company decision-making, multi-
stakeholder collaboration and governance, accountability and transparency.  
 
GNI members are expected to report on their activities and to submit themselves to 
independent assessments of their compliance with GNI guidelines.205 However, there are no 
sanctioning powers or other mechanisms in place to enforce such compliance. 
 
The GNI has been subject to criticism for its inactivity, and its difficulty in attracting new 
commercial members.206 The Electronic Frontier Foundation withdrew its membership in 
2013 due to a breakdown in trust regarding their independence from government influence 
following the 2012 NSA surveillance revelations.207  Recently, the GNI seems to have gained 
                                                          
202 Ibid. 
203 For a complete overview of participants, see: https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php.  
204 See further: https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/corecommitments/index.php.  
205 See further:  https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI_-
_Governance_Accountability_Learning.pdf.  
206 See, for example: http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2011/03/30/why-no-one-will-join-the-global-
network-initiative/; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/07/global-network-initiative_n_832408.html; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/technology/07rights.html.  
207 ‘EFF Resigns from Global Network Initiative’, Electronic Frontier Foundation Press release, 10 October 
2013, available at: https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-resigns-global-network-initiative.  
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more relevance with Facebook joining in 2013,208 and the publication of the GNI’s first 
company assessment in 2014, which reviewed participating companies’ observance of GNI 
principles on freedom of speech and privacy.209 It found all three companies reviewed – 
Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! – to be in compliance. It is unclear what direct consequences a 
negative outcome would have had. Until the GNI manages to obtain some powers to impose 
sanctions for breaches of its principles or otherwise enforce its guidelines, the GNI can best 
be seen as a platform to create awareness and share best practices.  
 
 
The above discussion shows that online commercial actors have been prepared to enter into 
self-regulatory regimes aimed at safeguarding end users’ fundamental rights. These initiatives 
range from nationally-bound to global cooperation, and from sector-specific rules on social 
media services to principles aimed at governing the entire ICT industry. Generally, globally 
active industry leaders have stated their preference for worldwide guidelines, and have 
resisted country-specific collaboration. However, these projects have not yet resulted in 
binding, enforceable codes of conduct, which means that existing self-regulatory initiatives 
govern the activities of the online intermediaries described in the case studies in Part II of this 
study only to a limited extent. As explained in the Introduction to this study, the case studies 
are styled as instances of privatized enforcement measures that are particularized rather than 
sectoral. It is interesting to note that a number of the examples used in the case studies 
involve GNI members. 
 
                                                          
208 For commentary, see: A. Kulikova, ‘Facebook Joins the Global Network Initiative – What to think of it?, 
LSE Media Policy Project Blog, 24 May 2013, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/05/24/facebook-
joins-the-global-network-initiative-what-to-think-of-it/. 
209 GNI, Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process for Google, Microsoft and Yahoo, 8 January 
2014, available at: https://globalnetworkinitiative.org//news/gni-report-finds-google-microsoft-and-yahoo-
compliant-free-expression-and-privacy-principles.  
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PART II 
4. Case studies of privatized enforcement measures 
4.1. Context 
4.1.1. Introduction 
 
The second part of this study uses three case studies to consider the use of privatized 
enforcement measures by online intermediaries. It focuses on the qualitative differences 
between various techniques employed in blocking and filtering practices by online 
intermediaries. In examining these techniques, the study considers the extent to which certain 
methods currently used for privatized enforcement online are compatible with fundamental 
rights, most notably the right to freedom of expression, the right to access information, the 
right to privacy, data protection rights, the right to a fair trial, the right to an effective legal 
remedy, the freedom to conduct a business and the freedom to provide services. 
 
The focuses of the case studies are: 
  
- Non-judicial notice-and-takedown procedures of social networking services;  
- Voluntary use of content-ID tools by hosting providers to avoid liability for illegal 
content, and  
- Voluntary scanning of private data by online service providers and the subsequent 
reporting of users to law enforcement agencies. 
  
As explained in Part I of this study, the European and international human rights framework 
is traditionally applied in the context of state-related measures. Yet, given that public and 
private communications are now largely intermediated by private actors, the role of the state 
is changing and may appear to be becoming more peripheral. The application of human rights 
in this domain requires further refinement to fully take account of these changes. In order to 
set the stage for the case studies, it is useful to first identify potential factors that are relevant 
to this assessment. Three potential factors will be considered here: degrees of dominance of 
online intermediaries, degrees of state involvement in self-regulatory or privatized 
enforcement measures and potential remedies for breaches of rights.  
 
4.1.2. Degrees of dominance 
 
An increasingly important theme in the analysis of the applicability of human rights to online 
self-regulation is the dominance of a company. In the context of competition law, dominance 
is generally related to a company being able to sustainably increase its prices or lower its 
quality. From the perspective of individual users, however, dominance is more usefully 
framed in terms of dependence. In situations of dependence, it is unattractive for users to 
switch to other companies, for example because there are few (or no) viable alternatives or 
because switching is costly.  
 
In the online environment, highly concentrated markets are not uncommon. This is partly due 
to network effects: a service connecting its users becomes more attractive as its user base 
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grows. Alternatives are often unattractive because of their lack of users. 
 
Even in the absence of market concentration, companies sometimes agree to coordinate their 
measures across a market. When those companies are dominant in a given market and there is 
dependence on their services, it can become impossible for a user not to be subject to those 
coordinated measures. An arguably positive example of such practice is the coordinated 
blacklisting of spam-sending IP-addresses. 
 
In markets where the service facilitates transactions between customers and non-customers, 
the effects of concentration are further compounded. It can then be nearly impossible for a 
user to avoid interactions with a dominant company. For example, even if one does not have a 
Gmail-account oneself, it is difficult to avoid e-mailing Gmail-users. 
 
The dependence on a certain service can also be related to the nature of the service. For 
example, services which mostly provide entertainment, could more easily be abandoned than 
services that are also used for more business purposes or for interacting with the government. 
 
Thus, the degree of dominance of a company is relevant in three ways for a human rights 
analysis. Whenever a company has a broad customer base, measures applied by the company 
affect large numbers of people. In addition, where the company also facilitates interactions 
with non-customers, those measures also (indirectly) affect people who did not even choose 
to become a customer. Lastly, the nature of the service can make it more difficult to abandon 
a service, for example when the alternative services are very limited or are not of practical 
worth. 
 
4.1.3. Degrees of state involvement 
 
As pointed out in the Introduction, this study concerns “pure” self-regulation, as opposed to 
other forms of regulation, such as co-regulation. Even within this narrow field, however, 
various degrees of state involvement can be identified and distinguished. It is useful to 
provide a rough outline of these varying degrees as a precursor to the case studies. 
 
At the one end of the spectrum, one can think of purely voluntary self-regulatory measures – 
without any involvement or pressure from the state or others whatsoever. Measures could, for 
example, be intended to safeguard the reputation of a company, to cater to specific religious 
convictions or to lower the operating costs of a company. Often, however, these measures are 
less voluntary than they may appear at first sight.  
 
Firstly, the state can have a hand in the process of creating the measures. The state could 
facilitate meetings between companies to agree on coordinated measures, providing the 
meeting space, drafting the agenda and taking notes, etc. Even when the outcome of such 
meetings may be a completely private agreement, a certain degree of state involvement 
should be acknowledged (where it exists). 
 
Secondly, the state can have a hand in influencing the substance of measures. The most 
obvious example would be where the state instructs companies to take measures and that the 
failure to do so will lead to the state introducing legislation with the same aim. The state 
could also be involved as a participant in coordinated discussions between industry players 
(which could also be considered a form of co-regulation). Alternatively, the state could offer 
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financial incentives to steer measures. 
 
Lastly, the state can be involved in the execution of self-regulatory measures. For example, 
the government may inform service providers that certain information published on their 
platform violates their terms of service, without it being illegal. This is exactly what the 
Dutch government is doing in order to remove websites it deems undesirable, as research by 
Bits of Freedom has shown.210 
 
The degree of state involvement is very relevant for the research question that this study sets 
out to answer. Traditionally, “state action” is required to trigger the application of the human 
rights framework. The above already suggests that too rigid an understanding of the “state 
action”-doctrine would not do justice to the varying degrees of, and degrees of complexity of, 
state involvement in self-regulatory measures. 
 
In addition, a more detailed analysis of these kinds of state involvement should also be 
related to other factors, such as the degree of dominance discussed above. When a relatively 
“light” form of state involvement relates to a measure taken by a dominant party, this should 
arguably be more quickly considered as “state action”, than when it relates to a measure taken 
by a small (i.e., non-dominant) party. 
 
4.1.4. Potential remedies 
 
Lastly, potential remedies to address infringements also differ. This particular subject is not 
thoroughly investigated in the present study and merits further research, so we only touch 
briefly on selected examples here.  
 
One of the shortcomings often identified with self-regulatory measures is the lack of 
democratic legitimacy: the rules are decided by private parties without consultation with 
persons affected by the rules or a form of oversight by those persons, even though they have 
effects which in some cases are quite comparable to laws adopted by a parliamentary 
procedure. This shortcoming, where it is present, could be addressed by introducing certain 
due process obligations on the service provider, possibly by legislative means.  
 
Another remedy, related to the first, would be the imposition of transparency obligations. The 
provider could, for example, be obliged to have unambiguous terms of service, and also apply 
them in a fair and non-arbitrary manner. This could also take the form of a requirement to 
report on the effectiveness of a certain measure, taking into account its stated goals. Both 
possibilities would fall under the banner of fundamental rights-driven consumer protection. 
 
As a more far-reaching requirement, one could imagine the necessity, proportionality and 
subsidiarity requirements being imposed on self-regulatory regimes. Factors such as the 
measures, their stated goals and their effectiveness and the severity of the infringement could 
be taken into account in such an assessment. 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to note that there is a plausible relationship 
between the factors set out above and the potential remedies that can be contemplated. A light 
degree of state involvement would only necessitate lighter remedies, such as those relating to 
                                                          
210 See Bits of Freedom 13 October 2014, “NCTV vraagt wat gevorderd moet worden”, to be found at 
https://www.bof.nl/2014/10/13/nctv-vraagt-wat-gevorderd-moet-worden/. 
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transparency. A heavier degree of state involvement would, on the other hand, require more 
far-reaching necessity and proportionality obligations. 
 
4.1.5. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is argued that the application of the human rights framework to self-
regulatory measures in the online environment requires an assessment of the interplay 
between different elements. One element which plays an important role in the assessment is 
the dominance of the private actors involved. Another is the degree of state involvement. A 
third element is the remedies to address infringements. Other elements may also be identified, 
as will be seen in the case studies, below.  
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4.2. Case study 1: Social networking services 
 
With the advent of web 2.0, the Internet has been transformed from a top-down repository of 
editorial content to a horizontal platform where all users can contribute. The introduction of 
comment sections, and the increasing ease and availability of free blogging and hosting 
services, are examples of web 2.0 methods of end-user participation. Increasingly, online 
services function as intermediary platforms for user-generated content. Although 
intermediaries typically do not exercise far-reaching control over transmitted content, they 
are nevertheless equipped with the means to remove communications and block users from 
their services. As such, these actors can occupy an influential position as ‘gatekeepers’ to 
online forms of expression.211  
  
One category of user-generated content intermediaries which hold a place of particular 
importance in online discourse is Social Network Services (SNSs), more commonly known 
as ‘social media’. Most definitions of this term include the following characteristics: SNSs 
allow for the creation of users profiles, enable customers to establish a network of 
connections to other users (displayed in connection lists), and to share content and 
communications within these networks. 212  The term may thus apply to a variety of 
intermediaries, such as blogging sites, wikis, chat services and discussion boards, all of which 
facilitate the creation of virtual communities.213 Insofar as these platforms allow a broader 
range of users to voice their opinions and have them heard, SNSs have been hailed by some 
as contributing to the ‘democratisation’ of the media environment by lowering the barrier for 
civil society participation.214 
 
The central role that SNSs have come to play in public debate requires a close examination of 
their observance of users’ free speech rights. Many acts of civil society participation now 
originate in social networks, ranging from awareness-raising campaigns such as Kony2012 
and the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge, to the organisation of public manifestations such as the 
Occupy movement, the spontaneous vigils following the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the 
#blacklivesmatters protests. They have even been important enabling factors for political 
revolt in the 2009 Iran uprising – often called ‘the Twitter revolution’- and the Arab Spring 
revolutions.215 Conversely, it has become difficult to imagine a significant social movement 
without a substantial social media presence. The Council of Europe has described online 
social networking services as “human rights enablers and catalysts for democracy”. 216 
Therefore, incidents such as Facebook’s removal of the event page for an anti-Putin rally 
                                                          
211 See further: J. Zittrain, ‘A History of Online Gatekeeping’, 19 Harv. J. Law Technol. 253 (2006); P.O. 
Looms, “Gatekeeping in Digital Media”, Mapping Digital Media Reference Series No. 8, Open Society Media 
Program, April 2011. 
212 D. Trottier & C. Fuchs, ‘Theorising Social Media, Politics and the State: An Introduction’, in D. Trottier & C. 
Fuchs, Eds., Theorising Social Media, Politics and the State (Routledge, 2014); D. Boyd & N. Ellison, ‘Social 
Network Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship’, 13 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 1 
(2008), p. 212-216. 
213 Trottier & Fuchs, op. cit., p. 16-19. 
214 H. Margetts, ‘The Internet and Democracy’, in W. Dutton, Ed., The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies 
(Oxford University Press, 2013). 
215 P. Howard & M. Huzzain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave?: digital media and the Arab Spring (Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
216 Rec CM/Rec (2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection of human rights 
with regard to social networking services. 
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should give us pause for thought.217 Many social networks have created processes for the 
removal of user content without the need for a court-ordered injunction, but these systems 
can sometimes result in blocking measures which are questionable from a free speech 
perspective.  
  
To what extent does this form of private ordering ensure the observance and enforcement of 
free speech rights? This case study will focus on two well-known SNSs, Facebook and 
Twitter, and examine their policies as to the voluntary removal of user content.   It will start 
by examining the legal status of these platforms regarding their liability for hosted content 
under EU law, followed by a review of their opportunities and incentives for content 
censorship, including a discussion of their Terms of Service (ToS) and a critical examination 
of a selection of past blocking decisions.  
 
 
4.2.1. The legal position of SNSs 
 
Neither Facebook nor Twitter actively monitors its content in search of illegal or otherwise 
undesirable content. A Twitter spokesman has explained their blocking policy as follows: 
“The key is that this is reactive only.  It’s on a case-by-case basis, in response to a valid 
request from an authorized entity. […] Twitter does not mediate content, and we do not 
proactively monitor Tweets.”218 Facebook employs a similar policy, where content can be 
brought to the attention of a moderation team which does not independently seek out content 
for removal.219 These SNSs thus take a passive, neutral approach towards the content their 
users generate, and blocking measures are reactions triggered by complaints from inside or 
outside their community.  
 
This ostensibly neutral stance allows SNSs to qualify as ‘hosting providers’ under Article 14 
of the E-Commerce Directive.220 Consequently, they cannot be held liable for hosting content 
so long as they have no actual knowledge of its illegality and act expeditiously to remove it 
upon obtaining such knowledge.221 Therefore, since SNSs can be expected not to perform any 
independent investigation of content legality, liability is only likely to arise once SNSs 
receive a notification by third parties which would provide them with such knowledge.  
Insofar as SNSs are willing to act on these notifications, the current legal framework thus 
provides tools for private parties to effectuate the removal of content from social networks 
without the need to obtain a court order.  
 
It should be noted that notification alone does not automatically trigger a removal obligation 
for SNSs, as the CJEU has stated that liability only arises when the hosting provider ‘was 
                                                          
217 T. Parfitt, ‘Russia blocks Facebook site urging rally for anti-Kremlin activist Alexei Navalny’ The Telegraph 
21 December 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11306880/Russia-blocks-
Facebook-site-urging-rally-for-anti-Kremlin-activist-Alexei-Navalny.html.  
218 A. Latifi, ‘Making Sense of Twitter’s Censorship’, Al Jazeera 28 January 2012. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/01/201212835211882918.html.  
219  M. Sweney, ‘Mums furious as Facebook removes breastfeeding photos’, The Guardian 30 December 2008.  
220 Recital 42 E-Commerce Directive defines hosting acitvities as: ‘[activities] is of a mere technical, automatic 
and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor 
control over the information which is transmitted or stored’. See also Joined cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 
Google v. LVHM, 23 March 2010 and Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. Ebay (2011) I-06011, para. 112.  
221  Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, Article 14(1).  
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actually aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have identified the illegality’.222 While illegality may be obvious in some cases, such 
as pre-teen child pornography, there are many examples where information is not so readily 
identifiable as such, including complex defamation disputes or politically controversial forms 
of hate speech. In such cases, the illegality of content is closely linked to the end user’s free 
speech interests. A contribution to a public debate, may, for example, provide a defence 
against allegations of libel, while journalists may report on hate speech by others as a matter 
of public interest. 223  It therefore follows that, when faced with a notification of illegal 
content, SNSs are expected to make an independent assessment of the content’s status. The 
determination of illegality by SNSs in such cases is thus inherently affected by the level of 
free speech protection afforded to end users. The CJEU’s decisions in Promusicae and UPC 
Telekabel require them to strike a fair balance between the fundamental rights affected, 
including free speech, when implementing blocking injunctions, but it remains unclear 
whether they have such an obligation when deciding on voluntary removal and informal 
takedown notices.224  
 
The above shows that the protection of end users’ free speech rights will largely depend on 
their SNSs’ evaluation of the competing rights involved. Where the often complex task of 
determining the legality of content would traditionally lie with the courts, the private ordering 
of online content requires SNSs to perform a similar examination. How can we expect them 
to perform this task? On the one hand, if SNSs are overly complacent with removal demands, 
this could lead them to block content where they have no legal obligation to do so. On the 
other hand, a more intractable approach might expose them to liability once judicial redress is 
sought, for failing to comply with their obligation of “expeditious removal”. This raises the 
question of which of these two evils our social networks are more likely to choose.  
 
4.2.2. Terms of Service and the assessment of takedown requests 
 
There are numerous factors that make the protection of free speech rights in the face of 
takedown demands an unlikely prospect. First of all, it should be noted that SNSs generally 
include very broad blocking discretions in their Terms of Service (ToS), the contractual 
provisions which govern their relationship with end users. This can be illustrated by a brief 
review of Facebook and Twitter’s content removal powers. 
 
Article 5 of the Facebook ToS, titled ‘Protection of Other People’s Rights’, starts with the 
following paragraphs: 
 
(1) You will not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates 
someone else's rights or otherwise violates the law. 
(2) We can remove any content or information you post on Facebook if we believe that it 
violates this Statement or our policies.225 
 
Removal is thus permitted for those content categories prohibited under the Terms of Service, 
and for any content that infringes individual rights or violates the law. The contractual 
                                                          
222 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal and Others, op. cit., para. 122. 
223 See, for example, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. 
224 See section 1, above. 
225 Facebook Terms of Service. https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms.  
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prohibitions are mainly outlined in Article 3, ‘Safety’.226 Its proscriptions range from rules on 
security, intellectual property and commercial usage to prohibitions of bullying, harassment 
and intimidation, as well as the posting of hate speech, pornography, nudity, and gratuitous 
violence. Article 3(10) even prohibits all use of Facebook “to do anything unlawful, 
misleading, malicious or discriminatory”. 227  With such terms, there remains little which 
would not be susceptible for removal; exaggerated headlines, insincere compliments, 
retouched photographs, even misconstrued sarcasm could be considered misleading. What’s 
more, these prohibitions apply to all cases where Facebook believes that a violation of their 
statement has occurred, which would relieve them of the burden of even having to prove the 
infringing nature of the targeted content. Thus, while content removal is conditional upon 
some form of contractual infringement or illegality, the contractual prohibitions are defined 
so broadly as to provide a large degree of interpretive discretion for Facebook, and end users 
are left with no meaningful contractual grounds to contest their blocking decisions.  
   
A similar rule is in place for the termination of services to particular users, also known as 
‘banning’, which could be considered an even more severe intervention measure. Article 12 
of the Facebook ToS reads: “If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise 
create risk or possible legal exposure for us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to 
you.”228 Given the broad range of ToS prohibitions, as well as the prohibition of violations in 
spirit, users are once more faced with an almost unlimited removal discretion.  
 
Whilst Facebook requires at least some infringement or illegality to permit termination and 
content removal, Twitter’s powers of intervention are unconditional. Article 8 of the Twitter 
ToS reads: “(…) We reserve the right at all times (but will not have an obligation) to remove 
or refuse to distribute any Content on the Services, to suspend or terminate users, and to 
reclaim usernames without liability to you.”229 (emphasis added). Reference is made to ‘the 
Twitter Rules’, which outline Twitter’s policy as to prohibited content.230 In comparison to 
Facebook’s content rules, they seem more protective of the user: besides rules on security and 
commercial communications, all they prohibit is impersonation, violent threats, ‘unlawful 
use’, and pornography. Nevertheless, these rules are merely guidelines within a contractual 
framework which allows any and all removals and bans. 
 
This brief review shows that blocking measures will only result in a breach of contract under 
exceptional circumstances, since ToS provisions are so broad as to provide a pretext for 
removal for almost every takedown request imaginable. Furthermore, even if such a breach of 
contract were to occur, it is unlikely that the prospect of judicial redress by end users could 
go far in dissuading SNSs. Firstly, since SNSs are as a rule free-to-use services, and tend to 
prohibit direct commercial use of their networks, it is unclear which damages could result 
from blocking content – it is certainly unlikely to exceed the potential liability following from 
neglecting to remove, say, IP infringements or defamation. Secondly, most consumers are 
simply not likely to resort to judicial remedies in the first place – a phenomenon described by 
Lilian Edwards as the “inertia of consumers in relation to litigation”. 231  These factors 
                                                          
226 Facebook Terms of Service.  https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms.  
227 Facebook Terms of Service. https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms.  
228 Facebook Terms of Service. https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms.  
229 Twitter Terms of Service. https://twitter.com/tos.  
230 The ‘Twitter Rules’: https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules.  
231 L. Edwards, WIPO Report: Role and responsibility of internet intermediaries in the field of  
copyright and related rights (WIPO 2005), p.12, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermediaries
_final.pdf.  
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combined effectively prevent end users from playing an active role in correcting undue 
blocking decisions, which in turn might encourage intermediaries to pursue risk-avoidant 
content policies to the detriment of free speech.  
 
It could be argued that end users have knowingly and willingly submitted themselves to the 
possibility of intermediary content moderation, as evidenced by their acceptance of the Terms 
of Use. The principle of consumer choice would then be invoked to justify the current 
framework for content removal. However, as Ellen Wauters, Eva Lievens and Peggy Valcke 
have pointed out, SNSs display many characteristics which limit the role of consumer choice 
in ensuring an appropriate level of protection.232  These factors include the informational 
asymmetry between business and consumer, the network effects of social media and the 
investment required of users in establishing their profiles and networks (the ‘stickiness’ of 
social media).233 In light of these considerations, unwarranted or unexpected content blocking 
should be not be seen as a possibility that end users knowingly and willingly subject 
themselves to as a result of free and informed choice between various online service 
providers. End users may be not be fully aware of removal conditions, or may simply lack 
suitable alternative options. Indeed, Facebook allows access to a potential audience of over a 
billion users worldwide, while Twitter counts over 250 million users. In terms of scope and 
reach, there are no equivalent alternatives for consumers unsatisfied with their broad removal 
competences. Considering the strong network effects of social media services, individual 
users have little meaningful choice in selecting their platform on the basis of free speech 
concerns, and are effectively forced into this environment of unrestricted and unforeseeable 
intermediary blocking powers. 
   
The permissive terms described above stand in stark contrast to the principles and guidelines 
drafted by the GNI, of which both Facebook and Twitter are members. As regards freedom of 
expression, these include a subsidiarity principle (“Interpret government restrictions and 
demands so as to minimize the negative effect on freedom of expression” 234 ) and 
transparency requirements towards affected end users. These recommendations provide a 
commendable ideal for SNS policies, and would go some way in protecting end users against 
arbitrary and unaccountable content removal. However, they are not yet reflected in the 
Terms of Service provided towards end users, who have no meaningful contractual grounds 
to hold SNSs accountable.   
 
4.2.3. Blocking decisions in practice  
 
A review of Facebook’s past blocking decisions shows that many are necessary to comply 
with local laws and norms. On its website, it states that: “Holocaust denial is illegal in 
                                                          
232 E. Wauters et al., ‘Towards a better protection of social media users: a legal perspective on the terms of use 
of social networking sites’, Int J Law Info Tech (2014). 
233 Chiu defines the ‘stickiness’  of social networks as inviting “repetitive visits to and use of a preferred Web 
site because of a deeply held commitment to reuse the Web site consistently in the future, despite situational 
influences and marketing efforts that have the potential to cause switching behavior.” T. Chiu, “Note. 
Irrationally bound: Terms of Use licenses and the breakdown of consumer rationality in the market for social 
network sites” (2011) 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 167-213, 10. On consumer consent in social media Terms of 
Use, see: E. Wauters et al., ‘Towards a better protection of social media users: a legal perspective on the terms 
of use of social networking sites’, op.cit.  
234 Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines, available at: 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php.  
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Germany, and so if it is reported to us we will restrict this content for people in Germany”.235 
While this particular national law could be considered a legitimate restriction of free speech, 
this country-specific approach has also led to some arguably un-democratic blocking 
measures. It would fall outside the scope of this study to address the jurisdictional 
complexities involved in the legal assessment of these cases, but these incidents can serve to 
illustrate the pressures on SNSs to censor their networks. For example, it has been reported 
that a number of Facebook pages dedicated to criticism of the dominant Hong Kong political 
party were banned without giving any reason in 2010. 236  Furthermore, a page aimed at 
organising a political rally organised by the prominent activist Alexander Navalney was also 
removed without a court order.237 
 
Facebook has been criticised for removing numerous UK anti-monarchist activist pages in the 
run-up to the 2011 royal wedding.238 The removal of these pages coincided with the arrest of 
numerous activists, although Facebook denied any link between these occurrences, and 
claimed that the removal was part of a routine, a-political removal of pages created under 
fake personal profiles (a violation of the ToS).239 Even if we assume that Facebook was not 
acting under any outside pressure, and that this was a matter of mere coincidence (although, 
given the Russian cases this possibility cannot be ruled out for future incidents), this example 
illustrates how the broad range of prohibitions under SNS user agreements, coupled with far-
reaching sanctions such as outright removal of entire pages, can potentially be used by 
governments to undermine legitimate, legal forms of expression.  
 
Another interesting example was Facebook’s refusal to remove a Mexican beheading video, 
based on their policy that displays of violence were to be prohibited only insofar as the 
content “encouraged or celebrated” these actions.240 However, after extensive criticism in the 
UK, including comments from the Prime Minister, they altered their policy and decided to 
remove the video for being contrary to their prohibition of “gratuitous violence”.241 Here we 
see that, even absent explicit orders, government pressure can have far-reaching influence on 
intermediary content policies. Since there is no demonstrable causal link between David 
Cameron’s statements and Facebook’s policy changes, it would be difficult for end users to 
contest this blocking decision as a direct government restriction of their rights. In some cases 
this political pressure may not even be made in public settings, such as when Angela Merkel 
confronted Mark Zuckerberg over anti-immigrant hate speech on Facebook during a UN 
summit.242 This private, off-the-record conversation only became known because a nearby 
microphone had accidentally been left on. In such cases of informal pressure it can be 
particularly difficult to demonstrate government involvement in what can amount to 
measures of censorship. As Yochai Benkler has argued, this “regulation by raised eyebrow” 
                                                          
235 https://govtrequests.facebook.com/ 
236 E. Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (Public Affairs, 2012). 
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238 J. Preston, ‘Facebook Deactivates Protest Pages in Britain’, The New York Times Blog 29 April 2011, 
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allows states to circumvent free speech safeguards by placing pressure on intermediaries.243 
SNSs’ broad powers of removal in private relationships thus create a point of entry for 
unaccountable state interference with online speech.  
 
The eagerness of governments to rely on the speech regulating powers of SNSs services has 
become particularly clear in the activities of police referral units such as the UK’s Counter-
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU). These centres monitor SNSs and refer supposedly 
terroristic content to the intermediary responsible. Their policy is not to explicitly order the 
removal of such content, but rather to notify the intermediary who must then independently 
determine whether it constitutes a breach of its Terms of Service.244 In this manner, the 
CTIRU claims to have achieved over 50,000 instances of content removal. 245  The EU’s 
counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has recommended that other Member 
States launch similar operations.246 Europol has also launched its own EU Internet Referral 
Unit, which aims, inter alia, to coordinate such national efforts. 247  Here, the same 
fundamental dynamic is at play as in the above examples with Cameron and Merkel, albeit on 
a much larger scale; systems of non-binding pressure are exerted by state authorities in order 
to influence the ostensibly voluntary policies of SNS. By emphasizing the SNS’s discretion 
rather than that of public officials, and by the standards of Terms of Service rather than the 
standards of the law, this ”regulation by raised eyebrow” can be achieved without triggering 
conventional constitutional safeguards.248  
 
Social media content moderation can also prove a threat to less overtly political forms of 
speech. For instance, an Italian woman’s Facebook post showing of two women kissing in 
support of LGBT rights was removed as a violation of the prohibition on ‘pornography and 
sexual content’, after other users reported flagged this content for removal.249  A similar 
source of controversy has been Facebook’s policy to comply with requests for the removal of 
images of breastfeeding, due to the nudity involved.250 These incidents show that non-judicial 
notification and takedown procedures do not have the sole function of avoiding liability for 
illegal content, but can also serve as a means for the SNS operator to employ more editorial 
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forms of content curation. 251  In reference to the breastfeeding controversy, a Facebook 
spokesman has stated that “[t]he photos we act upon are almost exclusively brought to our 
attention by other users who complain.”252 However, the selective or inconsistent application 
of ToS prohibitions in these user-initiated content flagging processes allows Facebook to 
selectively intervene and remove content which it – or its user community – finds 
undesirable. This introduces an element of arbitrariness and intermediary interference which 
could be seen as detrimental to free expression and the media pluralism.253 Furthermore, 
depending on how freely and proactively such intervention is performed by SNSs, these 
policies may raise questions as to their neutral character as intermediaries and thus their 
eligibility for protection under the safe harbour of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive.   
 
Like Facebook, Twitter responds to removal requests by governments and third parties. On 
the whole, Twitter policy grounds for content removal are more restricted, so that far-
reaching curation of otherwise legal content, such as Facebook’s anti-breastfeeding decisions, 
has not yet occurred. Government requests have led Twitter to remove a group of national-
socialist accounts in order to comply with German hate speech laws.254  Other examples 
include the blocking of two accounts belonging to political dissidents in Turkey.255  It has 
also resulted in compliance with Pakistani court orders to remove blasphemous content and in 
the blocking of a Ukrainian activist account at the request of a Russian court.256 As the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation has argued, these decisions were remarkable in light of the 
fact that Twitter held no assets in these jurisdictions, and thus could not be compelled to 
comply with these orders.257 Furthermore, the Russian order was aimed at a non-Russian 
account, which illustrates how, given the international span of SNS activity, 
(over)compliance with national rulings can also erode the effective enjoyment of free speech 
rights in other jurisdictions. 
 
In a departure from its otherwise largely passive stance, Twitter has taken major steps to 
remove terrorist activity from its service. In 2015, Twitter tripled the size of its content 
moderation team, expanded their definition of prohibited ‘violent or threatening’ behaviour, 
and began experimentation with automated algorithms for the filtering of abusive or 
inappropriate content.258 This policy shift and the resulting removals were not ordered by any 
court, but can instead be seen as a response to the demands of Twitter users, who might be 
offended or shocked by such content; to public opinion, in order to avoid a reputation of 
facilitating terrorism; and to demands of government authorities, who might otherwise resort 
to more coercive, intrusive measures.  
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A relatively recent innovation in Twitter’s content moderation policy has been the application 
of ‘content withholding’ measures rather than outright blocking.259 This entails that certain 
content which runs afoul of regional prohibitions such as territorial IP rights or national hate 
speech laws can be rendered inaccessible in those regions, without affecting regular use in 
other jurisdictions. While some have criticised this approach as a concession to the demands 
of undemocratic foreign regimes, it can also be seen as the lesser of two evils in comparison 
to the blocking of content on a global level.260 If we return to the requirement from UPC 
Telekabel that a ‘fair balance’ of fundamental rights must not unnecessarily deprive internet 
users of lawful access to information, content-withholding could be seen as generally less 
restrictive than absolute blocking measures.261 
 
That being said, the chilling effect that regional withholding measures have on online 
expression in foreign jurisdictions could also serve to stifle or disincentivize online forms of 
speech. The utility of social media for, say, Turkish dissidents or Ukrainian activists will be 
greatly reduced if these groups are incapable of reaching their local audience. While access to 
their content would remain possible for foreign users, the chilling effect of these region-
specific measures could then still be detrimental to social media expression on a global scale. 
Therefore, while content-withholding  might be seen as the ‘lesser of two evils’  in 
comparison to total removal, intermediaries must still apply these  measures with restraint 
and be aware of their broader effects on online expression.  
 
4.2.4. Conclusions 
 
This case study indicates that the current legal environment does not adequately incentivize 
the observance and enforcement of free speech rights by Social Network Services vis-à-vis 
their users. Theoretically, free speech defences must be taken into account while assessing 
the legality of user-generated content, but the ECHR and EU fundamental rights frameworks 
have not yet confirmed an obligation on online intermediaries to uphold such a right in 
voluntary removal decisions (i.e., removal in the absence of an official injunction). 
Furthermore, the high transaction costs involved in this evaluation and the low level of user 
protection in ToS agreements make it so that SNSs rarely have a direct interest in upholding 
free speech. This may lead them to ignore or undervalue free speech arguments in assessing 
claims of illegality, or even to knowingly remove legal content without regard to their users’ 
free speech rights. Thus, there are few legal mechanisms preventing social media services 
from becoming agents of arbitrary and unforeseeable censorship. 
 
The lack of enforceable safeguards for end users provides a point of entry for state authorities, 
who can persuade SNSs to block content through informal pressure. This “regulation by 
raised eyebrow” effectively allows them to sidestep free speech safeguards otherwise 
applicable to direct state interference, especially where their involvement remains invisible to 
the affected end users. Furthermore, as SNSs have increasingly shown themselves prepared to 
remove legal content at the behest of private notifications and to proactively monitor their 
communities for policy breaches, it also provides a point of entry for private actors to unduly 
limit the speech of others. So long as the free speech principles embraced in self-regulatory 
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projects are not translated into directly enforceable rights for end users, this lack of 
safeguards presents a structural risk of abuse by both public and private interests.  
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4.3. Case study 2: Hosting content generated by users 
 
4.3.1. Background 
  
In the Internet ecosystem, hosting providers play a key role: they supply the hosting services 
that users need in order to upload content they have generated (User Generated Content or 
UGC). While this content can take the most disparate forms – e.g. videos, images, texts, 
audios, animations, etc. – platforms that offer to store and to make UGC available to the 
public have become the backbone of what is nowadays known as Web 2.0.262 Usually, hosting 
providers offer an ample package of services to users. In addition to the possibility to store, 
i.e., merely upload content to their servers, they offer assistance and sometimes a 
comprehensive infrastructure that renders UGC more appealing, easier to consult or to search, 
or better looking. 
 
Significantly, hosting providers can offer services that allow users to generate revenue from 
associated advertising. This is a very important aspect, as advertising is one of the main 
sources of income for hosting providers – and a strong incentive that attracts users to the 
hosting service. However, all these activities that exceed the mere offer of hosting capacity, in 
particular advertising, can be seen by courts as non-neutral activities, i.e., activities that have 
the potential to disqualify hosting providers from the specific safe harbour created to exempt 
them from secondary liability. Examples of this type of safe harbour can be seen in the EU E-
Commerce Directive, the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and the Canadian 
Copyright Act.263  
 
It is therefore extremely important for hosting providers to meet the conditions required in 
order to enjoy the liability exemption. Activities such as those mentioned above, and in 
particular the offer of advertisements related to the potentially infringing video, could be 
interpreted by courts as acts performed under the authority or control of the intermediary, a 
circumstance under which the liability exemption does not apply.264 
 
As will be outlined in this case study, an alternative course of action for intermediaries is to 
enter into voluntary agreements with right-holders and users in order to limit their liability 
exposure. As will be shown, however, this way is not as balanced towards all the subjects 
involved (namely towards users) as the legislatively regulated one. 
 
4.3.2. Case scenario: YouTube 
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In order to better illustrate the depicted situation, a real example can be used. YouTube, the 
video-sharing website created in 2005 by three PayPal employees and owned by Google 
since 2006, lends itself perfectly to the exercise. Almost all the videos uploaded on YouTube 
are provided by users, even though some content is provided directly by right-holders. Any 
Internet user can watch the videos without any authentication, but only registered users can 
upload them. As a general rule, the maximum length of videos is set at 15 minutes; This 
limitation is not related to technical issues but to specific policy considerations: When no 
time limit was imposed most videos exceeding 15 minutes were infringements of copyright 
specific to TV shows and movies.265  
 
Videos can be watched on the YouTube website or embedded in different websites, in such a 
way that users of an embedding website can watch the video without having to be visibly 
redirected to the YouTube website. The video, nonetheless, is physically stored on YouTube 
servers and not on those of the embedding website. YouTube also implements a number of 
localized websites, that is to say perfect copies of the main website, but translated into the 
local language and, frequently, adapted to the local legal framework. YouTube usually 
redirects users automatically to the localized version of the website on the basis of the IP 
address. This explains why, for instance, users from a given country trying to watch a video 
sometimes see the message “Video not available in your country” while users from a different 
country (or spoofing their IP address) can still watch that same video. 
 
 
4.3.3. Voluntary measures: the Content ID tool 
 
In spite of the described efforts to limit the upload of videos infringing third parties’ 
copyright, YouTube, together with its parent company Google, has increasingly been the 
object of attention of right-holders’ claims. Right-holders’ perception of YouTube’s business 
model is perplexed at best, since most of the content, they claim, is uploaded by users without 
the authorization of copyright owners. On several occasions right-holders have reported that 
the number of infringing videos available is in the order of hundreds of thousands, which 
have led to claims for billions of dollars in damages.266  
 
In addition to the delicate liability issue, Google’s vast financial strength constitutes a strong 
incentive in this type of litigation, an aspect that increases both the number of cases filed and 
the amount of damages sought.267 To prosecute individual users is a time-, resource-, and 
reputation-consuming activity and, particularly for cases of copyright infringement, the 
amount in damages that courts award to plaintiffs does not always justify the investment. This 
is true also in countries such as the US, where courts under certain circumstances can award 
statutory damages up to $150,000 per infringement.268 While the punitive nature of these 
kinds of damages is certainly perceived by the convicted infringer, it does not represent a real 
compensation for right-holders, if compared to industry’s claims that attribute losses of 
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billions of dollars to ‘piracy’. Additionally, many content and media corporations have 
become aware of the controversial perception that an aggressive and litigious strategy against 
individuals triggers in the public opinion. 
  
Conversely, to prosecute a big corporation allows copyright holders to try to recover damages 
in the amount that they claim and to have a realistic expectation that the defendant, if 
convicted, will be able to pay the entire amount. Furthermore, the public opinion perception 
of lawsuits between corporations is much more neutral, compared to the case of a corporation 
suing individual users. 
 
In 2007, in order to further limit the amount of uploaded infringing content and consequently 
its exposure to copyright infringement lawsuits, YouTube implemented the Content ID tool, a 
voluntary system that the promoters hoped could seriously limit – or even eliminate – the 
possibility to upload content previously identified as infringing.  
 
A brief description of the tool is necessary due to the complexity of the issue. Right-holders 
that meet certain criteria are eligible to file a request to YouTube to be admitted to the 
program. Once accepted into the program, right-holders can submit their copyrighted material 
(any sort of audio-visual material) to YouTube, which in turn will “scan” it and store the 
resulting ID in a database. YouTube quantifies estimates that over 25 million IDs are stored in 
its database.269 When a user uploads a new video on YouTube, the video is automatically 
checked against the ID content in the database and if a match is found YouTube will contact 
the right-holder. However, unlike what would happen in a typical case of notice and take 
down, in this case YouTube (rectius Google) shows its deep understanding of Web 2.0 social 
and economic dynamics by offering right-holders the possibility to take any of the following 
actions: 
 
  Mute the audio that matches their music; 
  Block a whole video from being viewed; 
  Monetize the video by running ads against it; 
  Track the video viewership statistics. 
 
Interestingly, any of these actions can be country-specific, in light of the IP address 
identification mentioned above. Accordingly, right-holders are able to segment the market 
and determine in which countries they want the content to be blocked, or monetized, and in 
which the statistics of the video need to be analysed. The actions can also be device-specific, 
meaning that right-holders can determine which action should apply depending on the type of 
device (desktop, mobile, e-reader, embedding system) used.270 
 
However, as previously stated, not every right-holder can participate in this scheme. To be 
approved, users “must own exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is 
frequently uploaded by the YouTube user community”, a status currently enjoyed by 
approximately five thousand “partners”. 271  Under this condition, it seems clear that the 
Content ID scheme’s main function is to accommodate the needs of major audio-visual and 
media groups, and not those of small or individual right-holders. The latter can – except in 
very special cases – rarely demonstrate ownership of rights “to a substantial body of original 
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material that is frequently uploaded”. 
 
Another critical element that emerged in the aftermath of the introduction of the new tool 
relates to the accuracy of the ID matching system. As Fred von Lohmann – at the time 
attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF272) – noted, the tool has been used by 
some of the groups admitted to the program to remove extremely large amounts of audio-
visual content.273 Many of these removals were clear fair use cases,274 which led to the author 
employing the concept of “wholesale censorship” to describe the practice.275 Other observers 
called this a “fair use massacre” and substantiated the accusation with a number of real 
cases.276 The problem is recognized by a large cross-section of civil and academic society, 
and projects aiming to monitor the evolution of removal claims have blossomed.277  
 
Indeed, the use of copyright protected material can be legitimate due to specific exceptions 
and limitations to exclusive rights and fair use/dealing claims. As seen in the first part of this 
study, the CJEU and the ECtHR have developed a consistent body of case law on the matter 
of identifying in the ‘fair balance’ of the fundamental rights involved the theoretical 
framework within which specific solutions should be framed.  
 
It seems self-evident that, while a sophisticated algorithm can effectively and efficiently 
identify similarities in uploaded content (but see the results of an independent test of 
YouTube’s Content ID in 2009 concluding that, while the system was “surprisingly resilient” 
in finding copyright violations in the audio tracks of videos, it often failed to detect useful 
meta-information, such as repeat infringers278), the correct evaluation of a specific legal 
situation in which competing fundamental rights have to be balanced can only be achieved 
following clearly defined and transparent procedures and guarantees. The intrinsic difficulty 
of this type of evaluation is recognized by the law, which created specific mechanisms 
intended to balance conflicting claims and to give the party whose content was removed for 
alleged copyright infringement a fair chance to react to the allegations. As was seen in Part I 
of this study, the protection of fundamental rights in the online environment include the 
availability of effective remedies when such rights are infringed, as well as the guarantees of 
fair trials for alleged infringers.279 
                                                          
272 “The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the 
digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact 
litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development”; see https://www.eff.org/about. 
273 F. von Lohmann, Testing YouTube's Audio Content ID System, April 29 2009, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/testing-youtubes-aud. 
274 The Web is full of incidents reporting content wrongly removed due to the automatic and unchecked 
matches produced by the Content ID system. A good illustration is present on one of the forums hosted by 
Google: https://productforums.google.com/forum/?hl=en#!category-topic/youtube/how-to-use-youtube-
features/eSjKSGBrFMo  
275 F. von Lohmann, Testing YouTube's Audio Content ID System, April 29 2009, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/testing-youtubes-aud. 
276 See C. Mcsherby, The Fair Use Massacre Continues: Now Warner’s Going After the Babies, March 12, 
2009, available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/fair-use-massacre-continues-now-warner-s-going-aft. 
277 See generally the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, a collaborative archive founded by several law school 
clinics in the US,  http://chillingeffects.org/; specific to YouTube removals, and active until recently, the project 
“YouTomb” hosted by the MIT, http://archive.is/youtomb.mit.edu.  
278 Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Testing YouTube's Audio Content ID System”, 29 April 2009, available at: 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/testing-youtubes-aud 
279 See J. Urban & L. Quilter, “Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects’? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act”, Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 22, p. 
621, 2006; W. Seltzer, “Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on 
the First Amendment”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 24, p. 171, 2010. 
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These legal frameworks include the previously cited E-Commerce Directive (EU), DMCA 
(US) and the recently reformed Canadian Copyright Act. Whereas these interventions are 
characterised by marked differences in approach – and are certainly not exempt from 
problematic aspects – they can be seen as the statutory recognition of the complexity required 
in finding a proper balance between conflicting fundamental rights in the online 
environment.280  
 
The Content ID system, on the contrary, can be seen as a procedure which checks ex-ante 
newly uploaded content against large databases of works owned by right-holders in real 
time.281 During this largely automated phase the possibility to develop an analysis to ascertain 
whether a specific use can be covered by fair use/dealing or other exceptions or limitations to 
copyright (ELC) is clearly absent, a situation that leads to numerous cases of “false 
positives”.282 If a match is found, the right-holder is informed and can decide what to do with 
the content: block it in a variety of ways, monetize it, or analyse viewership. It is only at this 
point that the right-holder has the possibility to determine whether the use of his content 
could have been fair.  
 
However, it is clear that in the light of the sometimes hundreds or thousands of daily 
notifications received, right-holders are usually unable to analyse all cases with the required 
attention even at this stage (and this phase is often out-sourced to third parties). Furthermore, 
right-holders’ “conflict of interest” is equally apparent when they have to determine whether 
the use made by others of their own work in the absence of their own authorization can 
constitute a legitimate use. 
 
Users are left with two choices: the first one is to take no action, in which case the content 
that they uploaded remains in the condition chosen by the alleged right-holder (e.g., muted, 
blocked or “monetized”). Alternatively, the uploader of the blocked content can decide to 
take action and dispute the claim. If this happens, the right-holder can release the claim or 
confirm it, in which latter case the uploader will still be able to “appeal” a Content ID claim 
(only up to three times and only if possessing a verified account in good standing), and the 
right-holder at this point will only be able to release the claim, or to “take down” the audio or 
video. The latter option, also known as “copyright strike” leads to an immediate halt to the 
audiovisual content, and causes the account of the uploading user to enter a state of “bad 
standing”, with limited features. If three “copyright strikes” are received, the account is 
terminated.  
 
A final critical element relates to “contractual agreements” concluded by YouTube and right-
holders, which eliminate the possibility for users to oppose a claim of copyright infringement 
filed through the Content ID scheme or even in the case of a formal notification. YouTube 
informs users about “Videos removed or blocked due to YouTube's contractual obligations” 
and explains that: 
                                                          
280 While the Canadian approach does somehow resemble the US one in terms of granularity, it is still too 
young to be properly evaluated. The system created by the E-Commerce directive leaves to Member States the 
possibility to establish take-down procedures, but this opportunity has not been taken by the large majority of 
Member States. 
281 See: http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html. 
282 See for a recent example regarding the block of a video in which a renown legal scholar during an academic 
conference showed a few seconds of a protected content, see http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2014/10/13/who-
owns-the-world-cup-the-case-for-and-against-intellectual-property-rights-in-sports/. This represents a clear case 
of 'false positive' as confirmed by the fact that the right holder was very responsive in releasing the block. 
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“YouTube enters into agreements with certain music copyright owners to allow use of their 
sound recordings and musical compositions. In exchange for this, some of these music 
copyright owners require us to handle videos containing their sound recordings and/or 
musical works in ways that differ from the usual processes on YouTube. Under these 
contracts, we may be required to remove specific videos from the site, block specific videos 
in certain territories, or prevent specific videos from being reinstated after a counter 
notification. In some instances, this may mean the Content ID appeals and/or counter 
notification processes will not be available. Your account will not be penalized at this 
time” (emphasis added).283 
 
In other words, users will be denied the possibility to have their content reinstated on 
YouTube not only in case of filing a Content ID claim, but even when filing a DMCA or 
DMCA-like counter-notification under the conditions established by e.g. Sec. 17 USC 512(g) 
or by other similar national legislation.284 
 
This is upheld by the terms that users accept when registering for the service. YouTube's 
Terms of Service (at least in the US version) state that: 
 
“If a counter-notice is received by the Copyright Agent, YouTube may send a copy of 
the counter-notice to the original complaining party informing that person that it may 
replace the removed Content or cease disabling it in 10 business days. Unless the 
copyright owner files an action seeking a court order against the Content provider, 
member or user, the removed Content may be replaced, or access to it restored, in 10 
to 14 business days or more after receipt of the counter-notice, at YouTube's sole 
discretion” (emphasis added).285 
 
From this brief analysis it is possible to conclude that if procedures such as those 
autonomously created and self-regulated (e.g., Content ID) or those regulated by legislative 
intervention (e.g., DMCA) are intended to balance the position of right-holders and users in 
their quest for either fast removal or fast reinstatement, then YouTube's voluntary agreements 
with right-holders severely limit one side of this important balance, namely the one leading to 
the protection of users and of their ability to express themselves on the Internet. 
 
 
4.3.4. Considerations on the Content ID tool as a private measure intended to limit 
the uploading of infringing content 
 
Proponents argue that the Content ID scheme operates as a privately drafted buffer inserted 
just before the more serious notice and take-down procedure in order to bring more balance 
and flexibility to a system where opposing positions are creating considerable shortcomings. 
However, from what could be observed, Content ID can be better conceptualised as an 
additional layer that safeguards the interests of right-holders and, indirectly, of intermediaries, 
without offering any corresponding enhancement to users’ interests. 
 
Qualifying right-holders will benefit from an automated ex-ante system that flags all 
matching content offering them the possibility to block, monetize, or monitor it, eventually 
                                                          
283 See: http://www.youtube.com/t/terms?gl=US.  
284 Namely that the counter-notice contains all the legally required elements and that the right-holder does not 
file an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity, within the 
established time frame; See 17 USC 512(g)(2)(C). 
285 See: http://www.youtube.com/t/terms?gl=US. 
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discriminating geographically or by device. This constitutes a set of interesting, and 
definitively more flexible, opportunities for right-holders to exploit their works in ways that 
the standard notice-and-take-down procedures do not envisage. The benefits for YouTube are 
equally evident: a much higher likelihood that the content will remain on its servers. This not 
only reduces the removal of content from the service (up to 25 million unique items), which 
already represents quite a remarkable result, but also permits YouTube to receive additional 
revenue from the associated ads. The revenue of Content ID ads account for a considerable 
share of the overall monetized views on YouTube.286  
 
Nevertheless, users – the third element of this equation – do not enjoy any additional benefit; 
on the contrary, the total number of removal claims is greatly increased, as it is now based on 
an automated, ex-ante verification tool that is simply not able to decipher the usually complex 
cases of legitimate uses. Similarly, the possibility for users to resist take-down requests is not 
equally empowered: while it is true that a simple dispute of a Content ID claim will not 
automatically start a legal proceeding, it is also true that the Content ID scheme is not 
alternative or preliminary to a standard notice-and-take-down procedure. Right-holders can 
decide to file a formal removal request at any time, including during a Content ID claim, and 
cause not only the immediate removal of the content but also to “copyright strike” the 
account of the user. Therefore, it is left to the discretion of right-holders to decide which way 
to proceed: a standard notice and take-down procedure, a Content ID claim, or both.  
 
Therefore, users are substantially left with the same tool that they had before: either to leave 
the content down or react and try to have the content reinstated facing the risks and the costs 
of a possible lawsuit against a corporation. Moreover, it can be added to this already critical 
picture that under the conditions explained above (i.e., YouTube’s voluntary agreements with 
right holders), users are deprived of their right to a Content ID appeal or to a counter-
notification procedure. The resulting situation for individuals expressing their creativity and 
ideas on YouTube and similar platforms is alarming. 
 
It should be stressed that the main function of copyright is to strike a delicate balance 
between the interests of authors and other right holders in the control and exploitation of their 
works on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the fundamental rights to freedom 
to impart and receive information, privacy, and communication rights on the other hand.287  
 
Fair use/dealing and ELC are an integral part of the copyright system because they are the 
recognition in positive law of society's interest that individuals should be allowed to make 
certain unauthorised uses of copyrighted material.288  
 
Private ordering tools, such as those concluded between intermediaries and right-holders, 
                                                          
286 YouTube's statistics speak of hundreds of millions of dollars for partners, which means that an even bigger 
share is retained by YouTube. Wikipedia, citing the same statistic page but accessed in 2013, reports that a third 
of all YouTube monetized views were connected to Content ID; see 
http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html and the cited Wikipedia entry for YouTube. 
287 See T. Dreier, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary 
Rights?’, in R. Cooper Drefuss, D. Leenheer Zimmerman and H. First, Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 295-316; P.B. Hugenholtz, “Copyright, Contract and 
Code: What Will Remain of the Public Domain?”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2000/26, pp. 77-90. 
288 L. Guibault, Copyright Limitations and Contracts: An Analysis of the Contractual Overridability of 
Limitations on Copyright, The Hague, London, Boston, Kluwer Law International 2002, Information Law Series 
No. 9.
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safeguard the respective interests which are usually connected with the commercial 
exploitation of the works and of the platforms. These agreements are usually imposed on 
users who are not in a position to negotiate specific terms or conditions, but can only accept 
“take-it-or-leave-it” services that not only have become a standard medium of expression in 
the on-line lives of billions of people, but which also often lack realistic alternatives.  
 
Individuals’ communication rights are strikingly absent in the self-regulation model 
developed by intermediaries and right-holders. The resulting scenario is one where the 
legitimate uses linked to fundamental rights of the protected works, such as parody, critique, 
pastiche, news reporting, illustration for teaching, etc., are put under serious threat. The 
legitimacy of these kinds of agreements should accordingly be tested against the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and ECtHR. 
  
 
  
71 
 
 
4.4. Case study 3: The scanning of private data and reporting users to law 
enforcement 
 
Whereas the two previous case studies focused mostly on the communications freedoms 
aspects of measures imposed by private actors, this case study emphasises the privacy aspects. 
It takes as a starting point a highly topical issue: the voluntary scanning of private data by 
online service providers and the subsequent reporting of users to law enforcement agencies. 
 
Several big online service providers have been found to engage in such practices. Firstly, in 
2012 it was alleged that Microsoft automatically scanned privately accessible data in its cloud 
service OneDrive (formerly known as SkyDrive). Microsoft allegedly blocked the account of 
a Dutch user because he uploaded pornography, which was in violation of the terms of 
service of Microsoft, which at that time prohibited the storage of images containing nudity 
and partial nudity.289  
 
The terms of service have since been adapted, and Microsoft now no longer prohibits the 
storage of nude pictures in its online drive service. The new terms do, however, provide that 
stored material is automatically scanned for images of sexual child abuse (but it does not say 
explicitly that users may be reported to law enforcement). Recently, a man was also arrested 
because he uploaded two images of sexual child abuse to his OneDrive account. Microsoft 
informed the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) when the 
two images were flagged by its systems, and the NCMEC got in touch with the Luzerne 
County District Attorney’s Office.290 
 
Google was in the news for a related activity: it automatically scans emails stored in Gmail 
for images of sexual child abuse. For example, it was reported that a 41-year old Houston 
man was arrested and charged with possessing child pornography after Google sent a tip to 
the NCMEC.291 Microsoft’s online email service Outlook also scans emails for sexual child 
abuse material.292 
 
A third example of automated analysis of private data is Facebook. Facebook was in the news 
for analysing private chats on its platform and, together with other available data in the 
platform, reporting activity of possible predators to the police.293 Reuters reported that “a 
man in his early thirties was chatting about sex with a 13-year-old South Florida girl and 
planned to meet her after middle-school classes the next day.”294 Using a self-developed 
algorithm for scanning postings and chats for criminal activity, Facebook automatically 
flagged the conversation, and employees then read the conversation and reported the man to 
the police. The police arrested him the next day. 
                                                          
289 See http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/07/19/is-microsoft-spying-on-skydrive-users/. Microsoft in 
its code of conduct for Windows services still prohibits using its services for depicting nudity, see 
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-live/code-of-conduct .  
290 See http://www.philly.com/philly/news/Microsoft_cyber-
tip_gets_Pa_man_arrested_on_child_pornography_charges.html 
291 See http://www.khou.com/story/news/crime/2014/07/30/houston-man-charged-with-child-porn-possession-
after-google-cyber-tip/13378459/ 
292 See https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/presskits/photodna/ 
293 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-usa-internet-predators-idUSBRE86B05G20120712 
294 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-usa-internet-predators-idUSBRE86B05G20120712 
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It appears that this kind of scanning is currently primarily focused on sexual child abuse-
related offences. Dropbox, however, is already reported to scan certain shared links to its 
online cloud storage platform and block copyright-infringing links. 295  It would not be 
surprising if broader copyright and terrorism-related scanning is already being considered – 
or even applied – as an interesting approach by certain stakeholders. 
 
4.4.1. Scanning and reporting is an interference with privacy and sometimes 
communication freedoms 
The scanning of personal data for these purposes is obviously an interference with the right to 
privacy. A user storing this data intends the data to be accessible only by him or her. The 
service provider, however, automatically scans the data and if it is flagged as suspicious, the 
data will be further analysed by employees. The company might then share information about 
the user with other organisations and law enforcement authorities. 
 
The scanning is not only an interference with the privacy of users who are ultimately reported: 
it is an interference with the privacy of every user of the system, as the data of all users is 
subjected to analysis. This is particularly so for the scanning for matching images of sexual 
child abuse: all images stored in cloud or email services appear to be subjected to the 
matching software. The algorithm developed by Facebook to identify predatory behaviour 
appears on the other hand to have a certain proportionality built into the system: according to 
reports on the algorithm, Facebook does not monitor all chats, but only chats between minors 
and persons deemed to be potential predators, in view of attributes such as a high number of 
declined friend requests, a high proportion of contacts of one gender and the frequent 
changing of a birth date under and above the 18 years threshold.296 
 
The fact that the scanning by the companies involved is partly automatic is not relevant for 
the question of whether this is an interference with the right to privacy: the application of 
automated scanning technology is also an interference with the right to privacy. 
 
If the scanning is performed on private communications, it also amounts to an interference 
with communications freedoms, as the fear of surveillance can have a chilling effect for all 
users. Users will be less likely to use private chats or e-mail for the discussion of 
controversial matters, out of fear or uncertainty about potential consequences. This chilling 
effect is illustrated by a recent study on Google searches after the Snowden-revelations: it 
turns out that people use Google less often to search for terms which they deem controversial 
(such as ‘porn’ and ‘tax avoidance’).297 
 
Lastly, the reporting to law enforcement is also an interference with privacy and, where 
applicable, communications freedoms. From a data protection perspective, the transfer of 
personal data to a third party is already considered a form of processing (which would thus be 
                                                          
295 See http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/30/how-dropbox-knows-when-youre-sharing-copyrighted-stuff-without-
actually-looking-at-your-stuff/ 
296 See http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/apr/16/facebook-software-sexual-predators and 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/07/13/yes-facebook-scans-peoples-private-conversations-
looking-for-sexual-predators-and-child-porn/. 
297 See A. Marthews and C. Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior, 24 March 2014,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564 
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subject to data protection rules). More particularly, being reported to the police because of a 
suspicion for these crimes obviously negatively affects the persons involved.  
 
4.4.2. These are private initiatives with government links and very few serious 
alternatives 
 
Goals. The explicit goals of these initiatives, namely the prevention and detection of sexual 
child abuse, are very important and universally recognised as such under relevant human 
rights frameworks. The distribution of images of sexual child abuse, in certain cases the 
possession of such images and sexual child abuse itself are also criminal offences, at least in 
the US and in Europe.  
 
It must be noted that – notwithstanding the laudable goals of these programmes – their 
effectiveness is unclear, as little or no information on this is made publicly available. By 
extension, an analysis of the potential adverse consequences of such programmes, in 
particular the possible reduction of incentives for politicians to explore alternative, more 
effective methods to combat sexual child abuse, is lacking. 
 
Interests. The measures used by companies appear at first sight to be taken not in the 
interests of the companies involved, but primarily in the interests of law enforcement. This 
could be concluded from the fact that scanning is directed at offensive behaviour taking place 
in private. Where, for example, Facebook has a very direct interest in ensuring that no 
unlawful and shocking material is made publicly available on its platform, it has a much more 
indirect interest in ensuring that no offensive behaviour takes place in the more private types 
of messaging on its platform, such as direct messages and messages shared only with friends 
(see further in this connection, Case study 1). 
 
Upon further inspection, however, it becomes clear that companies have a vested interest in 
these kinds of programmes. Firstly, these programmes serve to bolster their reputation as 
“good citizens”. Microsoft, for example, has dedicated part of its website to information on 
the development and licensing of its image matching software, called PhotoDNA, boasting 
how it has become the industry standard for combating images of sexual child abuse 
online.298 In addition, these programmes arguably serve to politically legitimise the scanning 
of private data by these businesses for commercial purposes. 
 
Government links. The image matching on cloud and mail services and Facebook's 
monitoring is by and large a private initiative. Microsoft, and others, such as Twitter and 
Facebook, use PhotoDNA. Facebook has been licensing Microsoft’s technology since 2011, 
and Twitter has been using the technology since 2013.299 The Facebook-monitoring algorithm 
appears to have been developed in-house by Facebook. There are no laws obliging these 
companies to perform this kind of scanning. 
 
Certain links with government can also be identified, however. Firstly, from the news reports 
it can be gleaned that matches are used to tip off the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children (NCMEC), which subsequently reports to law enforcement. The NCMEC 
is authorized by US Congress to carry out a range of activities linked to the exploitation and 
                                                          
298 See http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/08/05/the-tech-war-on-child-porn/ 
299 See https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/presskits/photodna/ and 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/22/twitter-photodna-child-abuse 
  
74 
 
abduction of children. These activities include the operation of a tipline to report internet-
related child sexual exploitation and to transmit such reports to the appropriate local law 
enforcement agency for investigation. 300  It receives a small part of its funding from 
government sources, according to its 2012 annual report.301 Secondly, a large part of the 
database on the basis of which images are matched is provided by law enforcement agencies. 
How the PhotoDNA database is generated is not completely clear, but it appears that part of 
its database is based on a set of images collected by Interpol.302 In 2013, Google further 
reported that it was building a cross-industry database with part of the images provided law 
enforcement agencies and part by non-profits such as NCMEC and the Internet Watch 
Foundation.303 In this respect, it is also important to note that the image database used by the 
companies consists of digital fingerprints (so-called hashes), which cannot be independently 
evaluated by the receiving companies to be indeed illegal – as the hashes cannot be 
reconstructed back into images. This means that the companies using the database are highly 
dependent on the providers of the digital fingerprints, such as the government. Thirdly, online 
service providers are arguably obliged to report suspected sexual child abuse when they 
become aware of the presence on their systems, although this provision explicitly imposes no 
obligation on these providers to monitor users pro-actively.304 Fourthly, and most importantly, 
the scanning might ultimately result in government action: when one of the companies 
identifies an offender, law enforcement agencies will be informed, either directly or indirectly 
through NCMEC. These agencies subsequently might take action against offenders. Thus, 
through these initiatives, the government is arguably able to extend its surveillance powers – 
i.e., scanning the private data of users – to private communications and storage. 
 
Safeguards. There is currently a lack of transparency with regard to the internally applicable 
procedures. The terms of service of Google, Facebook and Microsoft in theory allow for – 
and to a certain extent inform about – this kind of scanning, but neither of these provides 
detailed information on the practices themselves. It is unclear what kind of safeguards are 
implemented by these companies to prevent false positives. From the news reports discussed 
in the introduction to this case study, it appears that the suspect is not accorded any due 
process before handing the file over to law enforcement. This might have to do with the 
nature of the offence, which arguably requires an immediate governmental response, and 
informing the suspect would hinder the investigation.  
 
Alternatives. The three services discussed above differ in terms of alternatives that are 
available. Email services are abundantly available, and there are many email services that do 
not use this kind of image matching technology. However, given the networked effects of e-
mails, and given the size of Gmail and Microsoft’s email services, it is very likely that you 
will have to communicate with people who will have their emails scanned by one of these 
companies. There are, consequently, very few serious alternatives to the e-mail services in 
question. 
 
There are more alternatives to Facebook’s private chat, although this is difficult to quantify. 
There are quite a few services available that allow for private chats outside of Facebook, 
                                                          
300 See http://www.missingkids.com/Authorization 
301 See http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC171.pdf 
302 See http://blogs.technet.com/b/publicyte/archive/2011/06/24/preventing-child-exploitation-microsoft-helps-
create-photodna-digital-forensics-for-the-national-center-for-missing-amp-exploited-children.aspx 
303 See http://googleblog.blogspot.nl/2013/06/our-continued-commitment-to-combating.html 
304 See 18 U.S. Code § 2258A - Reporting requirements of electronic communication service providers and 
remote computing service providers, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2258A 
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including via Gmail and Ping. WhatsApp deserves special mention here, as it has been 
acquired by Facebook, but it is reported to implement end-to-end encryption in its chat 
application, thus obscuring private communications even to the service provider itself (which 
in this case is Facebook/WhatsApp).305 As regards Facebook chat, it must be noted that 
Facebook is still a very popular platform and it can well be the case that for certain groups, it 
is difficult to avoid chatting via this social network. The issue described in the context of e-
mail services, where the sender has no choice but to communicate via the e-mail provider of 
the recipient, does not apply, however. 
 
Lastly, as regards alternatives to cloud services: there appear to be comparable services 
available which do not scan stored material, although not all of those services are free-of-
charge. 
 
4.4.3. Scanning and reporting, in particular of e-mail, problematic from a 
fundamental rights view 
 
Given the above, it can be argued that the voluntary automated scanning for images of sexual 
child abuse, in particular of e-mail services, is problematic from a fundamental rights point of 
view. Not only are there strong links with government, mostly in the form of government 
provided databases of digital fingerprints, but the monitoring might ultimately lead to action 
by law enforcement. The government through these voluntary actions thus extends its strong 
arm and its surveillance powers. All companies are furthermore generally not transparent 
about these practices, merely suggesting that information can be monitored, and it is unclear 
whether internal procedures of due process are in place. And since the biggest e-mail 
providers in the world are performing such automated scanning, it is difficult to avoid being 
subject to this government-facilitated surveillance. 
 
 
 
                                                          
305 See https://whispersystems.org/blog/whatsapp/. 
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5. Revisiting positive obligations of States 
 
Having considered the three case studies of the use of privatized enforcement measures by 
online intermediaries, this is a relevant juncture to revisit the (positive) obligations of States 
and tease out the implications of those obligations in the context of privatized enforcement. 
 
The following is a tabular overview of specific elements of States’ positive obligations 
concerning privatized enforcement by online actors. These elements have been distilled from 
the above analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR and CJEU, as well as relevant standard-
setting by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. The focus is mainly on the rights 
to freedom of expression, privacy and data protection, (intellectual) property, an effective 
remedy and other procedural rights. This focus subsumes other rights mentioned earlier in 
Part I of this study, such as the rights to assembly and association, which are relevant for 
participatory rights in democratic society. The range of rights covered by this focus 
correspond to those typically implicated in the fair balancing of fundamental rights that 
informs the nature and scope of States’ positive obligations. Indeed, the table as a whole 
should be read in the spirit of the need to strike a fair balance between fundamental rights, as 
consistently urged by both the ECtHR and the CJEU. 
  
The first column describes the nature of the positive State obligation in general terms. The 
second column points to where the obligation is laid down. The third column explains the 
aims of the positive obligation. The final column, drawing in part on the three case studies, 
suggests specific implications of the more general obligation that are relevant for governing 
the activities of online intermediaries. It must be borne in mind that these are implications for 
the States themselves, i.e., indications of measures that States are obliged to take to ensure 
that fundamental rights are exercised effectively in the relations between online 
intermediaries and their users. They are not presented as actions to be taken by the 
intermediaries themselves, as such.  
    
Positive obligation Source Aims Implications 
Guarantee (media) 
pluralism 
Informationsverein 
Lentia, Khurshid 
Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi, 
Appleby, Manole 
& Others 
Prevent monopoly or 
mitigate dominance of 
powerful groups/media  
Ensure availability of viable 
expressive alternatives, bearing in 
mind different functionalities of 
different media. 
Ensure other fundamental rights 
(e.g., to property or to conduct a 
business) do not prevent effective 
exercise of right to freedom of 
expression or destroy its essence, 
esp. when private property has de 
facto public function. 
Create a favourable 
environment for 
participation by 
everyone in public 
debate 
Dink, Yildirim, 
Steel & Morris, 
Khurshid Mustafa 
& Tarzibachi  
Prevent discriminatory 
access to media and 
forums of debate 
Ensure measures restricting access 
to content, services or 
infrastructure are not 
discriminatory or overly broad, or 
cause collateral censorship. 
Create a favourable 
environment for 
freedom of 
expression for 
everyone without 
Dink Prevent threats, violence 
and other crimes against 
participants in public 
debate and chilling effects 
arising from the same 
Ensure effective legislative 
frameworks are in place to counter 
such offences. 
Ensure privacy of communications 
(data) and put in place safeguards 
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fear against arbitrary surveillance. 
Ensure effective 
procedural 
safeguards and 
effective remedies 
in respect of the 
right to freedom of 
expression 
CM Recs, UPC 
Telekabel 
Prevent arbitrary and non-
transparent interference 
with right to freedom of 
expression without 
checks, balances and 
remedies 
Ensure climate in which any 
interferences by online 
intermediaries with access to 
content, services or infrastructure 
are proportionate, transparent and 
subject to administrative and 
judicial review, with appropriate 
remedies being available.  
Ensure effective 
procedural 
safeguards and 
effective remedies 
in respect of the 
rights to privacy 
and data protection 
Klaas, Kruslin, 
Malone, UPC 
Telekabel 
Prevent arbitrary and non-
transparent interference 
with rights to privacy and 
(in particular) data 
protection without checks, 
balances and remedies 
Ensure existence of regulatory 
framework and that it and its 
underlying principles are applied 
effectively in respect of online 
technologies. 
Ensure privacy of communications 
(data) and put in place safeguards 
against arbitrary surveillance. 
Ensure any interferences by 
intermediaries meet criteria of: 
legality; foreseeability; necessity;  
transparency; proportionality; 
effectiveness and reviewability. 
Provide for notification process by 
intermediaries whenever personal 
data is voluntarily passed on to law 
enforcement authorities or other 
parties. 
Guarantee that 
intellectual property 
rights are fairly 
balanced against 
freedom of 
expression rights 
Promusicae, 
Scarlet/SABAM, 
SABAM/Netlog, 
UPC Telekabel, 
L’Oréal 
Prevent undue restrictions 
on freedom to receive and 
impart content by 
engaging with 
technological and other 
contextual factors 
Develop law and policy 
frameworks to ensure that 
copyright enforcement measures, 
particularly automated ones, 
respect copyright exceptions and 
limitations while taking due 
account of fundamental rights, 
societal values and other 
contextual considerations. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The parameters of public debate are increasingly being shaped by private parties, notably 
online intermediaries. The descriptor, ‘new gatekeepers’, which is sometimes used to refer to 
these actors, does not fully capture the complex range of ways in which they control access to 
information, data and communications in the contemporary online environment. Their 
operative control of private forums that serve quasi-public informational and communicative 
purposes means that their actions and omissions can affect an array of fundamental rights, in 
particular fundamental communication rights, of individuals in different ways. The dominant 
positions enjoyed by several leading online intermediaries such as Apple, Facebook, Google,  
Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo, etc., intensify the impact that their activities can have on 
individual communication rights – for better or for worse. 
 
In light of the dominant positions and concomitant influence of online intermediaries in the 
context of public debate – a sine-qua-non for democratic society – the question of regulatory 
oversight of their activities takes on particular importance. A central focus of the present 
study is the extent to which the European and international fundamental rights framework can 
shape the scope and substance of privatized law enforcement by online intermediaries. 
Notwithstanding the existence and endeavours of the Global Network Initiative, the ICT-
sector is not governed by an over-arching, comprehensive, effective self-regulatory system. If 
it were to be developed and accepted across the sector, such a system could – as in other 
areas of law – complement existing regulatory standards with insightful, participatory, sector-
specific operational guidelines and/or codes of practice. In the absence of such a system, 
however, the focus must turn to more particularized forms of privatized law enforcement at 
the level of individual entities. 
 
The fundamental rights obligations created by European and international legal frameworks 
are primarily directed at States. A distinction can be made between negative State obligations 
(the duty not to interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights) and positive State 
obligations (the duty to take active measures in order to ensure the effective exercise of 
fundamental rights). States may not delegate their primary obligation to secure the realization 
of fundamental rights in practice, either to self-regulatory bodies, or to private parties. 
Genuine, effective exercise of fundamental rights may require positive measures of protection 
by States authorities, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, or specifically 
between online intermediaries and their users. In determining whether or not a positive 
obligation exists, a fair balance has to be struck between the different rights and interests 
implicated, as well as the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual 
or actor involved. These principles have been clearly established by the ECtHR – and also by 
the CJEU – but formal guidance on how to operationalize and implement them has been 
limited. In other words, the implications of these principles require further clarification. 
 
This study strives to fill that normative gap, by extrapolating from statements of principle by 
the two European Courts and, in keeping with the ‘living instrument’ and ‘practical and 
effective’ doctrines of the ECtHR and bearing in mind relevant standard-setting by other 
bodies, teasing out the implications of these principles for the ICT-sector. The ECtHR has 
stated that in principle the same criteria apply for determining whether there has been a 
violation of a State’s positive obligations as when there has been a violation of its negative 
obligations. This means that a State may be found to be in breach of its positive obligations 
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for its failure to prevent violations of individuals’ fundamental rights as a result of privatized 
law enforcement by online intermediaries. This study has found that criteria that could prove 
determinative in this respect include the: 
 
 Existence or development by the State of relevant regulatory frameworks; 
 Nature of the interference and its intrusiveness (specific techniques of blocking or 
filtering could prove determinative) and resultant chilling effect; 
 Demonstrable degree of involvement or complicity of the State in the interference; 
 Adherence to procedural safeguards by the actor (e.g. transparency, adequacy of 
information; accessibility of terms, conditions and procedures and foreseeability of 
their consequences, etc.); 
 Availability of independent and impartial (judicial) review and redress; 
 Dominant position of actor/availability of viable communicative alternatives; 
 
This study has also sought to fill a normative gap by teasing out the implications of positive 
state obligations in respect of privatized enforcement measures by online intermediaries. In 
doing so, it has borne the above criteria in mind, as well as the overarching concern to strike a 
fair balance between competing rights, and focused on the following positive obligations to:  
 
 Guarantee (media) pluralism;  
 Create a favourable environment for participation by everyone in public debate;  
 Create a favourable environment for freedom of expression for everyone without fear;  
 Ensure effective procedural safeguards and effective remedies in respect of the right 
to freedom of expression;  
 Ensure effective procedural safeguards and effective remedies in respect of the rights 
to privacy and data protection;  
 Guarantee that fundamental rights, including intellectual property rights, are fairly 
balanced against freedom of expression rights. 
 
The suggested implications have both substantive and procedural focuses. They are grounded 
in the study and they are intended to provide a starting point for a more focused and 
meticulous discussion on how to operationalize relevant positive obligations of States in the 
context of self-regulatory or privatized law enforcement measures by online intermediaries. 
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